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Abstract
We demonstrate, by a number of examples, that information-flow se-
curity properties can be proved from abstract architectural descriptions,
that describe only the causal structure of a system and local properties
of trusted components. We specify these architectural descriptions of
systems by generalizing intransitive noninterference policies to admit the
ability to filter information passed between communicating domains. A
notion of refinement of such system architectures is developed that sup-
ports top-down development of architectural specifications and proofs by
abstraction of information security properties. We also show that, in a
concrete setting where the causal structure is enforced by access control,
a static check of the access control setting plus local verification of the
trusted components is sufficient to prove that a generalized intransitive
noninterference policy is satisfied.
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1 Introduction
System architectures are high-level designs that describe the overall structure
of a system in terms of its components and their interactions. Proposals for
architectural modeling languages (e.g., AADL and Acme [Garlan et al., 2000])
vary with respect to their level of detail and contents, but at the most abstract
level, architectures specify the causal structure of a system.
The MILS (Multiple Independent Levels of Security and Safety) initiative
[Alves-Foss et al., 2006; Vanfleet et al., 2005; Boettcher et al., 2008] of the US Air
Force proposes to use architecture as a key part of the assurance case for high-
assurance systems. The details of the MILS vision are still under development
but, as articulated by Boettcher et al. [2008], it encompasses a 2-level design
process, consisting of a policy level and a resource sharing level.
At the policy level, the system is described by an architecture in the form
of a graph, in which vertices correspond to components and the edges specify
permitted communication between components. In this respect, the architecture
is like an intransitive noninterference security policy [Haigh and Young, 1987;
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Rushby, 1992; van der Meyden, 2007]. At the policy level, one might also specify
which components are trusted, and the local policies that these components are
trusted to enforce. According to the MILS vision, building a system according
to the architecture, by composing components that satisfy their local policies,
should result in the system satisfying global security and safety properties.
At the resource sharing level, MILS envisages the use of a range of infras-
tructural mechanisms to ensure that the architectural information-flow policy
is enforced despite components sharing resources such as processors, file sys-
tems, and network links. These mechanisms might include physical isolation,
separation kernels, periods processing, cryptography and separating network in-
frastructure. It is intended that this infrastructure will be developed to a high
level of assurance, so that a systems assurance case can be obtained by the
composition of the assurance cases for trusted components and systems infras-
tructure. It is hoped this will enable a COTS-like market for infrastructural
mechanisms and trusted components.
The key contribution of this paper is to demonstrate, through several ex-
amples, that it is in fact possible, as envisaged in the MILS literature, to de-
rive interesting information security properties compositionally from a high-level
specification of trusted components and their architectural structure. We focus
on compositional reasoning about information-flow security properties.
We present a framework that allows the specification of a system archi-
tecture with local constraints on some system components. To give a precise
meaning to the architectural structure, we extend the semantics for intransitive
noninterference developed by van der Meyden [2007]. An architectural interpre-
tation of this semantics has previously been given [van der Meyden, 2012]. In
order to express constraints on trusted components, we extend architectures by
labeling edges between components with functions that further restrict the in-
formation permitted to flow along edges. One of the contributions of the paper
is to give a formal semantics to the enriched architectures that include these
new types of edges. We also develop a theory of refinement for these enriched
architectures, which enables top-down, correctness-preserving development of
architectural specifications. It also enables simple proofs of information secu-
rity properties on complex architectures to be obtained using an abstraction of
that architecture.
We demonstrate the use of the framework through examples motivated by
systems with interesting security requirements. These include multi-level se-
cure databases, the Starlight Interactive Link [Anderson et al., 1996], a trusted
downgrader, and a simple electronic election system.
In each example, we identify an architectural structure and a mathematically
precise set of local constraints on the trusted components. We then show that
information-flow properties expressed in a logic of knowledge arise as a conse-
quence of the interaction of the local constraints and the architectural structure.
Our results show that for any system that is compliant with the architecture, if
the trusted components satisfy their local constraints then the system satisfies
the global information-flow properties.
The information security properties presented in the examples provide information-
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theoretic and application-specific guarantees. Thus, there are no covert channels
that can violate the information security properties, and the negation of each
information security property would constitute an application-specific attack.
Only a few examples have been presented to date to formally justify the
MILS approach to high-assurance secure systems development. One example
is developed in Greve et al. [2003], but with respect to a more concrete model
(based on a separation kernel formal security policy that deals with access con-
trol on memory segments) than the abstract, “noninterference” style semantics
we consider. Our policy level model is more abstract, and allows greater flexibil-
ity for implementations. However, we also consider a more concrete model, sys-
tems with structured state subject to “reference monitor conditions” [Rushby,
1992]. We show that in this setting, to prove that a system complies with one of
our extended architectures, it suffices to check a simple condition on the access
control setting and to prove local properties of the trusted components.
By developing an abstract semantics for architectures and specifications of
trusted components, and by developing additional examples, our work advances
the case that global information-flow security properties can be derived from
a high-level systems architecture and local constraints on trusted components
within this architecture, in the style of reasoning envisaged by Boettcher et al.
[2008].
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review architectures
and their semantics. In Section 3, we introduce the epistemic logic we use to ex-
press information security properties. In Section 4 we extend architectures with
filter functions that allow fine-grained specification of what information flows
between components. The extended architectures enable the proof of additional
information security properties. Section 5 extends previous work on architec-
tural refinement to account for filter functions. The concrete model based on
access control is developed in Section 6 and we consider possible platforms and
techniques that might be used to show the access control model holds in Sec-
tion 7. We discuss related work in Section 8. Section 9 concludes. We use
examples throughout, to illustrate and motivate the definitions and results.
2 Architectures and semantics
Architectures give a policy level description of the structure of a system. We
begin with a simple notion of architecture, following van der Meyden [2012]. A
richer notion will be introduced later.
An architecture is a pair A = (D,), where D is a set of security domains,
and the binary relation ⊆ D ×D is an information-flow policy. The relation
 is reflexive but not necessarily transitive. Intuitively, information is allowed
to flow from domain u to domain v only if u v. The relation is reflexive as
it is assumed that information flow within a domain cannot be prevented, so is
always allowed.
In the literature on information flow policies, domains are generally under-
stood to correspond to security levels. We use a more general interpretation,
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in which domains can may also correspond to system components or agents in
the system. In an implementation of an architecture, separate domains do not
necessarily utilize separate resources. Hardware, code, and data may be shared
between domains. Indeed, a key challenge is ensuring that the information-flow
policy is respected despite the shared use of resources.
2.1 Example: HL architecture
The architecture HL = ({H,L}, {(L,L), (H,H), (L,H)}) consists of two se-
curity domains H and L, and the information-flow policy indicates that infor-
mation is allowed to flow from L to H, in addition to the reflexive information
flows. We can depict HL graphically, indicating security domains with rectan-
gles, and the information-flow policy with arrows. We omit arrows for reflexive
information flows.
H L
2.2 Example: Hinke-Schaefer
A variety of architectures have been proposed for multi-level secure database
management systems (MLS/DBMS) [Thuraisingham, 2005]. In the Hinke-Schaefer
architecture [Hinke and Schaefer, 1975], several (untrusted) single-level DBMSs
are composed together in a trusted operating system. Each user interacts with
a single-level DBMS. The operating system enforces access control between the
single-level DBMSs, allowing more restrictive DBMSs to read the storage files
of less restrictive DBMSs, but not vice versa.
The following diagram shows architecture HS, which represents the Hinke-
Schaefer architecture for two security levels at the MILS policy level.
Huser Luser
HDBMS LDBMS
HF LF
Domains Huser and Luser represent users of a high-security and low-security
DBMS respectively; they interact with the single-level DBMSs HDBMS and
LDBMS respectively. The single-level DBMSs store their data in database files
denoted HF and LF . Note that information is allowed to flow to HDBMS from
both HF and LF , as the high-security DBMS is allowed to read the storage files
of both the high-security and low-security DBMSs.
The Hinke-Schaefer architecture is also known as the “operating system pro-
viding mandatory access control” architecture [Thuraisingham, 2005], as the
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operating system is trusted to enforce the information flows specified in the ar-
chitecture. This amounts to a decision to implement the policy level architecture
HS at the resource sharing level by means of a trusted separation kernel.
2.3 Machine model
To specify what it means for an implementation to satisfy an architecture, we
must first define what an implementation is. We use the state-observed machine
model [Rushby, 1992], which defines deterministic state-based machines. A
machine has a set of actions A, and each action is associated with a security
domain. Intuitively, if action a is associated with domain u, then a represents
a decision, choice, or action taken by the system component represented by
u. Actions deterministically alter the state of the machine, and we assume that
the observations of each security domain are determined by the current machine
state.
A machine is a tuple M = 〈S, s0, A,D, step, obs, dom〉 where S is a set of
states, s0 ∈ S is the initial state, A is a set of actions, D is a set of domains,
step : S×A→ S is a deterministic transition function, dom : A→ D associates
a domain with each action, and observation function obs : D×S → O describes
for each state what observations can be made by each domain, for some set of
observations O.
We assume that it is possible to execute any action in any state: the function
step is total. Given sequence of actions α ∈ A∗, we write s · α for the state
reached by performing each action in turn, starting in state s. We define s · α
inductively defined using the transition function step, by
s ·  = s
s · αa = step(s · α, a)
for α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A. (Here  denotes the empty sequence.) For notational
convenience, we write obsu for the function obs(u, ·), and obsu(α) for obsu(s0 ·
α), where α ∈ A∗.
Given a sequence α ∈ A∗, the view of a group of domains G of α is the
sequence of the group’s observations and the actions that belong to members of
the group. Intuitively, G’s view is the history of its observations and the actions
it has performed. The function viewG defines the view of domain G. We first
define the observation of group G at state s by obsG(s) = 〈obsu(s)〉u∈G, i.e. the
tuple of observations of individuals u ∈ G. The view function is then defined
inductively by
viewG() = obsG(s0)
viewG(αa) =
{
viewG(α) a obsG(αa) if dom(a) ∈ G
viewG(α) ◦ obsG(αa) otherwise
for α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A. To capture that the semantics is asynchronous and
insensitive to stuttering of observations, the definition uses the absorptive con-
catenation operator ◦: for set X, sequence α ∈ X∗, and element x ∈ X, α◦x = α
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if x is equal to the last element of α, and α ◦ x = αx otherwise. When G = {u}
is a singleton, we write viewu for viewG.
Finally, for any sequence of actions α ∈ A∗, we write α  G for the subse-
quence of α of actions whose domain is in the set G.
2.4 Semantics
A machine satisfies an architecture if, in all possible executions of the machine,
information flow is in accordance with the architecture’s information-flow policy.
We formalize this using an approach proposed by van der Meyden [2007], which
involves the use of a concrete operational model to define an upper bound on
the information that a domain is permitted to learn.
The operational model is captured using a function tau, which maps a se-
quence of actions α ∈ A∗ to a representation of the maximal information that
domain u is permitted to have after α, according to the policy . (Term “ta” is
derived from transmission of information about actions; the definition corrects
problems identified by van der Meyden [2007] with earlier “intransitive purge”
based semantics [Rushby, 1992].)
An action of v should convey information to u only if v  u. Moreover,
the information conveyed should be no more than the information that v is
permitted to have. Given machine M = 〈S, s0, A,D, step, obs, dom〉, function
tau is defined inductively by tau() = , and, for α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A,
tau(αa) =
{
tau(α) if dom(a) 6u
(tau(α), tadom(a)(α), a) otherwise .
Note that if information is not allowed to flow from dom(a) to u, then
tau(αa) = tau(α), i.e., the maximal information permitted to u does not
change. If information is allowed to flow from dom(a) to u, then the infor-
mation conveyed is at most the information that domain dom(a) is permitted to
have (i.e., tadom(a)(α)), and the action a that was performed. Thus, in this case
we add the tuple (tadom(a)(α), a) to the maximal information tau(α) that u was
permitted to have before the action a was performed.
A machine is TA-compliant with an architecture if it has an appropriate set
of domains, and for each domain u, what u observes in state s0 ·α is determined
by tau(α). That is, tau describes the maximal information that u may learn:
if in two runs α and α′ the maximal information that u may learn is identi-
cal (tau(α) = tau(α
′)), then u’s observations in each run must be identical
(obsu(α) = obsu(α
′)).
Definition 1 (TA-compliance) A system M is TA-compliant with architec-
ture (D,) if it has domains D and for all u ∈ D and all sequences α, α′ ∈ A∗
such that tau(α) = tau(α
′), we have obsu(α) = obsu(α′).
TA-compliance requires that if tau(α) = tau(α
′) then the observations of u
in state s0·α and in state s0·α′ are equal. The following lemma shows that in fact
TA-compliance implies that if tau(α) = tau(α
′) then viewu(α) = viewu(α′).
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Lemma 1 If M is TA-compliant with respect to architecture (D,), then for
all agents u and all α, α′ ∈ A∗ such that tau(α) = tau(α′) we have viewu(α) =
viewu(α
′).
Proof: By induction on |α| + |α′|. The base case is trivial. Suppose that the
result holds for all sequences of shorter combined length, and consider strings
αa and α′ such that tau(αa) = tau(α′).
We consider several cases.
• If dom(a) 6u then tau(α) = tau(αa) = tau(α′), so viewu(α) = viewu(α′),
by the induction hypothesis, and obsu(αa) = obsu(α), by TA-compliance.
By reflexivity of , we have dom(a) 6= u, so it follows that
viewu(αa) = viewu(α) ◦ obsu(αa)
= viewu(α)
= viewu(α
′)
• If dom(a)  u then tau(αa) = (tau(α), tadom(a)(α), a) = tau(α′). This
means that α′ 6= . Assume α′ = βb. Without loss of generality, we may
assume dom(b)  u, since otherwise we may apply the previous case with
the roles of αa and βb reversed. Let tau(βb) = (tau(β), tadom(b)(β), b).
Since tau(αa) = tau(βb), we have a = b, and by TA-compliance we have
obsu(αa) = obsu(βb). Also, tau(α) = tau(β), and so by the inductive
hypothesis, viewu(α) = viewu(β).
– If dom(a) 6= u, then
viewu(αa) = viewu(α) ◦ obsu(αa)
= viewu(β) ◦ obsu(βb)
= viewu(βb).
– If dom(a) = u then
viewu(αa) = viewu(α) a obsu(αa)
= viewu(β) b obsu(βb)
= viewu(βb).

3 Information security properties
We use a (fairly standard) propositional epistemic logic [Fagin et al., 1995b] to
express information security properties. The syntax is defined as follows:
φ, ψ ::= > | p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | KGφ
G ranges over groups of domains.
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M,pi, α  >
M,pi, α  p iff α ∈ pi(p)
M,pi, α  ¬φ iff M,pi, α 6 φ
M, pi, α  φ ∧ ψ iff M,pi, α  φ and M,pi, α  ψ
M,pi, α  KGφ iff M,pi, α′  φ for all α′ ∈ A∗ s.t. α ≈G α′
Figure 1: Epistemic Logic Semantics
In case G = {u} is a singleton, we write simply Kuφ for KGφ.
Formulas >, p, ¬φ, and φ ∧ ψ are standard from propositional logic: > is
always satisfied, and p is a propositional constant. Epistemic formula KGφ says
that the group of domains G, considered as a single domain, knows φ.
Formulas are interpreted using a possible worlds semantics, where a world
is a sequence of actions α ∈ A∗. A proposition is a set X ⊆ A∗. We say
proposition X is non-trivial if X 6= ∅ and X 6= A∗. An interpretation function
pi is a function from propositional constants to propositions.
We define the semantics of the logic using satisfaction relation M,pi, α  φ,
which intuitively means that formula φ is true given interpretation function pi,
and machine M that has executed sequence α ∈ A∗. Figure 1 defines relation
M,pi, α  φ. We write M,pi  φ if for all α ∈ A∗ we have M,pi, α  φ. We say
that φ is valid if M,pi  φ for all systems M and interpretations pi.
To interpret epistemic formulas KGφ, we use an indistinguishability rela-
tion for each group of domains G, that describes what sequences of actions
G considers possible given its view of the actual sequence of actions. Two
sequences of actions α ∈ A∗ and α′ ∈ A∗ are indistinguishable to group of
domains G, written α ≈G α′, if G’s views of the two sequences are identical:
α ≈G α′ ⇐⇒ viewG(α) = viewG(α′).
3.1 Group knowledge vs. Distributed knowledge
We note that the notion of group knowledge KG differs from distributed knowl-
edge [Fagin et al., 1995a], the notion most commonly used in the literature on
epistemic logic for the knowledge that a group would have if they pooled their
local information. The distributed knowledge operator DG for group G is given
semantics by
M,pi, α  DGφ iff M,pi, α′  φ for all α′ ∈ A∗ s.t. α ≈DG α′
using a different indistinguishability relation ≈DG , defined as the intersection of
≈u for u ∈ G. The reason we use group knowledge is that it proves to have
a stronger relationship to a type of architectural abstraction that we consider
below. The two notions are related by the following result.
Lemma 2 For u ∈ G, the formulas Kuφ⇒ DGφ and DGφ⇒ KGφ are valid.
Proof: That Kuφ ⇒ DGφ is valid is a well-known fact of epistemic logic. It
follows simply from the definitions by noting that if M,pi, α |= ¬DGφ then there
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exists α′ ≈DG α such that M,pi, α′ |= ¬φ. Since α′ ≈DG α implies α′ ≈u α, we
conclude M,pi, α |= ¬Kuφ.
For DGφ ⇒ KGφ, we similarly consider the contrapositive. If M,pi, α |=
¬KGφ then there exists α′ ≈G α such that M,pi, α′ |= ¬φ. We claim that
α′ ≈G α implies α′ ≈u α for all u ∈ G. It then follows that α′ ≈DG α, and hence
M,pi, α |= ¬DGφ.
To prove the claim, we show that there exists a function h such that for
any β ∈ A∗, h(viewG(β)) = viewu(β). The domain of this function is the set
of possible views of G in M . These are nonempty sequences of actions a with
dom(a) ∈ G and tuples 〈obsu(s)〉u∈G of observations. The first and last element
of such a sequence is a tuple of observations, and the sequence does not contain
any adjacent actions. We define the function h on such sequences as follows,
where δ ranges over sequences produced by viewG, a ∈ A, and t is a tuple of
observations indexed by G. We write tu for the component of t corresponding
to u ∈ G. (In particular, note that if t = obsG(s), then tu = obsu(s).)
h(t) = tu
h(δ a t) =
{
h(δ) a tu if dom(a) = u
h(δ) ◦ tu otherwise
h(δ t) = h(δ) ◦ tu
We prove that h(viewG(β)) = viewu(β) by induction on |β|. The base case
is trivial. Suppose that h(viewG(β)) = viewu(β) and consider βb.
Suppose first that dom(b) 6∈ G, so also dom(b) 6= u. Then, viewG(βb) =
viewG(β) ◦ obsG(βb).
• If obsG(βb) = obsG(β), then viewG(βb)) = viewG(β), and also obsu(βb) =
obsu(β). Moreover, viewu(βb) = viewu(β) ◦ obsu(βb) = viewu(β). Thus,
using the induction hypothesis, we have h(viewG(βb)) = h(viewG(β)) =
viewu(β) = viewu(βb).
• Otherwise, if obsG(βb) 6= obsG(β), then viewG(βb) = viewG(β) obsG(βb),
so h(viewG(βb)) = h(viewG(β)) ◦ obsu(βb) = viewu(β) ◦ obsu(βb) =
viewu(βb).
Alternately, suppose dom(b) ∈ G. Then viewG(βb) = viewG(β) b obsG(βb).
If dom(b) = u then h(viewG(βb)) = h(viewG(β)) b obsu(βb). If dom(b) 6= u
then h(viewG(βb)) = h(viewG(β)) ◦ obsu(βb). Either way, by the inductive
hypothesis, we have h(viewG(βb)) = viewu(βb).
Thus we have h(viewG(β)) = viewu(β) for any sequence β. Let α, α
′ ∈ A∗,
and assume viewG(α) = viewG(α
′). Then
viewu(α) = h(viewG(α))
= h(viewG(α
′))
= viewu(α
′).
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The converse relationship KGφ ⇒ DGφ is not valid. For example, consider
a system M with exactly two domains u, v, which both make observation ⊥ at
all states. Let G = {u, v}. Consider the proposition p with pi(p) consisting of
all sequences in which there is an action of domain u that precedes any action
of domain v. Let α = auav and α
′ = avau where au is an action of u and av
is an action of v. Then M,pi, α |= KGp, since viewG(α) = viewG(β) implies
that β = α. However, we have viewu(α) = ⊥au⊥ = viewu(α′), and similarly
for domain v, so α ≈DG α′. Since M,pi, α′ 6|= p, we obtain that M,pi, α 6|= DGp.1
3.2 Knowledge and architectural refinement
The value of using the less common notion KGφ of group knowledge rather
than distributed knowledge DGφ is that it captures the way that knowledge
properties are preserved under a particular type of architectural abstraction.
Given a system M = 〈S, s0, A,D1, step, obs, dom〉 and a surjective mapping
r : D1 → D2, define r(M) = 〈S, s0, A,D2, step, obs′, dom′〉 to be the system
that is identical to M , except that it has domains D2, and the functions dom
′
and obs′ are defined by dom′ = r ◦ dom, and, for u ∈ D2, obs′u(s) = obsG(s),
where G = r−1(u). Intuitively, each domain u in r(M) corresponds to the group
of domains r−1(u) in M , with every action of a domain in r−1(u) treated as an
action of u. Similarly, for a formula φ of the epistemic logic, we write r−1(φ)
for the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of a group G in a modal
operator in φ by the group r−1(G).
The existence of a surjective mapping r : D1 → D2 is one requirement for ar-
chitectural refinement, which we discuss in greater detail in later sections. The
following result shows that abstracting a system M to r(M) (or, conversely, re-
fining r(M) to M) preserves satisfaction of formulas, subject to a corresponding
abstraction on groups being applied in the formulas.
Theorem 1 Let r : D1 → D2 be surjective and let M be a system with domains
D1. Then for all interpretations pi, sequences of actions α of M , and formulas
φ (not including distributed knowledge operators DG) for agents D2 we have
r(M), pi, α |= φ iff M,pi, α |= r−1(φ).
Proof: We first claim that for all α, β ∈ A∗ and groups G ⊆ D2, we have
viewMr−1(G)(α) = view
M
r−1(G)(β) iff view
r(M)
G (α) = view
r(M)
G (β), where the su-
perscripts indicate the system within which views are computed. Note that, by
definition,
obs
r(M)
G (s) = 〈obsr(M)u (s)〉u∈G = 〈〈obsMv (s)〉v∈r−1(u)〉u∈G
and
obsMr−1(G)(s) = 〈obsMv (s)〉v∈r−1(G) = 〈obsMv (s)〉v∈r−1(u), u∈G.
1We remark that the example relies upon the assumption of asynchrony: it can be shown
that in synchronous systems we have KGφ ≡ DGφ.
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Since these expressions simply group the same collection of values indexed
by v in two different ways, there exists functions f and f−1 such that for
all states s, we have f(obsMr−1(G)(s)) = obs
r(M)
G (s) and f
−1(obsr(M)G (s)) =
obsMr−1(G)(s). Moreover, we have for states s and t that obs
r(M)
G (s) = obs
r(M)
G (t)
iff obsMr−1(G)(s) = obs
M
r−1(G)(t).
Given a function h on (group) observations, we generalize it to a function h+
on view-like sequences of actions and observations, inductively by h+(o) = h(o),
for o an observation, h+(σao) = h+(σ)ah(o) for σ a sequence, a an action and
o an observation, and h+(σo1o2) = h+(σo1) ◦ h(o2) for σ a sequence and o1, o2
observations.
We now prove the claim by showing that for all sequences of actions α, we
have f+(view
M
r−1(G)(α)) = view
r(M)
G (α)) and f
−1
+ (view
r(M)
G (α)) = view
M
r−1(G)(α).
The proof is by induction on α. We consider just the case of f+. In case
α = , we have f+(view
M
r−1(G)(α)) = f+(obs
M
r−1(G)(s0)) = f(obs
M
r−1(G)(s0)) =
obs
r(M)
G (s0) = view
r(M)
G (α). For sequences αa, there are two cases. If dom
M (a) ∈
r−1(G) then domr(M)(a) = r(domM (a)) ∈ G. Thus, in this case, using the in-
ductive hypothesis,
f+(view
M
r−1(G)(αa)) = f+(view
M
r−1(G)(α) a obs
M
r−1(G)(s0 · αa))
= f+(view
M
r−1(G)(α)) a f(obs
M
r−1(G)(s0 · αa))
= view
r(M)
G (α) a obs
r(M)
G (s0 · αa)
= view
r(M)
G (αa).
Alternately, if domM (a) 6∈ r−1(G) then domr(M)(a) = r(domM (a)) 6∈ G. In this
case, there are two further possibilities. If obsMr−1(G)(s0 ·α) = obsMr−1(G)(s0 ·αa),
then also obs
r(M)
G (s0 · α) = obsr(M)G (s0 · αa). Thus
f+(view
M
r−1(G)(αa)) = f+(view
M
r−1(G)(α) ◦ obsMr−1(G)(s0 · αa))
= f+(view
M
r−1(G)(α))
= view
r(M)
G (α)
= view
r(M)
G (α) ◦ obsr(M)G (s0 · αa)
= view
r(M)
G (αa).
The other possibility is that obsMr−1(G)(s0 · α) 6= obsMr−1(G)(s0 · αa), where we
have
f+(view
M
r−1(G)(αa)) = f+(view
M
r−1(G)(α) obs
M
r−1(G)(s0 · αa))
= f+(view
M
r−1(G)(α)) ◦ f(obsMr−1(G)(s0 · αa))
= view
r(M)
G (α) ◦ obsr(M)G (s0 · αa)
= view
r(M)
G (αa).
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Thus, in any case we have f+(view
M
r−1(G)(αa)) = view
r(M)
G (αa), completing the
induction. The argument for f−1+ is symmetric.
The result now follows by induction on the construction of φ. The cases
of atomic propositions and boolean operators are trivial. For formulas of the
form KGψ, we have r(M), pi, α |= KG(ψ) iff r(M), pi, β |= ψ for all sequences
of actions β with view
r(M)
G (α) = view
r(M)
G (β). By the induction hypothesis
and the claim proved above, this is equivalent to M,pi, β |= r−1(ψ) for all
sequences of actions β with viewMr−1(G)(α) = view
M
r−1(G)(β). This is equivalent
to M,pi, α |= Kr−1(G)r−1(ψ), i.e., M,pi, α |= r−1(KGψ). 
We note that the example given above to show the difference between group
and distributed knowledge also shows that Theorem 1 would not hold if we
were to include distributed knowledge in the language and analogously define
r−1(DGφ) = Dr−1(G)φ. For example, consider the function r with r(u) = r(v) =
w. Since r−1(Kwp) = K{u,v}p and M,pi, α |= K{u,v}p, we have r(M), pi, α |=
Kwp, hence r(M), pi, α |= Dwp. However, as shown above, we do not have
M,pi, α |= D{u,v}p, i.e., we do not have M,pi, α |= r−1(Dwp).
G-dependent propositions A proposition in a system M depends on the
actions of a group G if its truth value can be affected by making changes only
to the actions of domains in the group G. The notion of dependence of a
proposition on a group G is useful to specify confidential information in some
of our examples.
Formally, for a group G of domains and α ∈ A∗, say that a proposition
X ⊆ A∗ depends on G actions at α if there exists β ∈ A∗ such that α  G = β  G
but α ∈ X iff β 6∈ X. (Notation G is shorthand for the set D \G, and denotes
the set of all domains excluding those in G.) Intuitively, this says that which
G actions have occurred, and their placement with respect to the actions of
other domains, can affect whether or not the proposition holds. We say that
X depends everywhere on G actions if X depends on G actions at α for all
α ∈ A∗.2
We can also reason about how architectural abstraction affects G-dependent
propositions.
Lemma 3 Let r : D1 → D2 be surjective and let M be a system with domains
D1. Then proposition X depends on G actions at α in r(M) iff X depends on
r−1(G) actions at α in M .
Proof: Note that the restriction operation is relative to a system M ; to em-
phasize this we write α M G to indicate that we use the domain function from
M . Note also that
r−1(G) = r−1(G) .
2In earlier versions of this work, we used nontrivial G-action local propositions. A propo-
sition X is G-action local if for all α, β ∈ A∗, if α  G = β  G, then α ∈ X ⇐⇒ β ∈ X.
It can easily be seen that a non-trivial G-action local proposition is everywhere dependent on
G actions. Consequently, a formulation of our results using propositions that depend on G
actions is more general.
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By definition, X depends on G actions at α in r(M) if there exists β ∈ A∗
such that α r(M) G = β r(M) G and α ∈ X iff β 6∈ X. Similarly, X depends
on r−1(G) actions at α in M if there exists β ∈ A∗ such that α M r−1(G) =
β r(M) r−1(G) and α ∈ X iff β 6∈ X.
Since domM (a) ∈ r−1(G) iff domM (a) ∈ r−1(G) iff domr(M)(a) ∈ G, we have
α r(M) G = β r(M) G iff α M r−1(G) = β M r−1(G) .
It follows that X depends on G actions at α in r(M) iff X depends on r−1(G)
actions at α in M . 
3.3 Example: HL information security
The logic allows us to state information security properties about machines,
in terms of the knowledge of domains. The architecture can provide sufficient
structure to prove that a given information security property holds in all ma-
chines that comply with the architecture.
For example, using the HL architecture, we are able to show that in any
execution of any machine that complies with HL, the domain L does not know
any proposition that depends on H actions.
Theorem 2 If M is TA-compliant with HL and pi(p) depends on H actions at
α then M,pi, α  ¬KLp.
Proof: We first show, for any sequence γ ∈ A∗, that taL(γ) = taL(γ  {L}).
The base case, γ =  is trivial. Consider γa. If dom(a) 6= L then
taL(γa) = taL(γ) by defn taL
= taL(γ  {L}) by IH
= taL(γa  {L}) since dom(a) 6= L.
If dom(a) = L then
taL(γa) = (taL(γ), taL(γ), a) by defn taL
= (taL(γ  {L}), taL(γ  {L}), a) by IH
= taL(γa  {L}) since dom(a) = L.
Now, since pi(p) depends on H actions at α there exists β ∈ A∗ such that
α  {L} = β  {L} and α ∈ pi(p) iff β 6∈ pi(p). By what was shown above,
taL(α) = taL(α  {L}) = taL(β  {L}) = taL(β), so since M is TA-compliant,
by Lemma 1, we have α ≈L β and the result follows immediately. 
3.4 Example: Hinke-Schaefer
In the Hinke-Schaefer database architecture HS, none of the domains Luser ,
LDBMS , or LF know anything about the domains Huser , HDBMS or HF . This
is true even if we consider the group knowledge of Luser , LDBMS , and LF .
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Theorem 3 Let system M be TA-compliant with HS, and let G = {Luser , LDBMS , LF }.
If pi(p) depends on {Huser , HDBMS , HF } actions at α, then M,pi, α  ¬KGp.
Although we could prove Theorem 3 directly, we defer the proof to Sec-
tion 5.3, where the result follows easily from Theorem 2 and the relationship
between architectures HL and HS. (Specifically, architecture HS is a refine-
ment of architecture HL.)
Since Kup ⇒ KGp is valid for u ∈ G, it follows that also M,pi  ¬Kup for
u ∈ {Luser , LDBMS , LF }. In particular, Luser does not have any information
about the High side of the system.
4 Extended architecture
The architectures used so far impose coarse, global constraints on the causal
structure of systems. If u v then TA-compliance permits domain u to send
to domain v any and all data it has. However, in many systems, key secu-
rity properties depend on the fact that trusted components allow only certain
information to flow from one domain to another. Finer specification of infor-
mation flows in the architecture allow us to prove stronger information security
properties.
In this section we extend the notion of architecture by introducing filter
functions to allow fine-grained specification of what information flows between
domains. We define semantics for these extended architectures, and present
examples where the extended architectures allow us to prove strong information
security properties.
4.1 Filter functions
An extended architecture is a pair A = (D,), where D is a set of security
domains, and ⊆ D ×D × (L ∪ {>}), where L is a set of function names. We
write u fv when (u, v, f) ∈, write u v as shorthand for ∃f. (u, v, f) ∈,
and u 6v as shorthand for ¬∃f. (u, v, f) ∈.
Intuitively, u fv represents that information flow from u to v is permitted,
but may be subject to constraints. In case f = >, there are no constraints
on information flow from u to v: any information that may be possessed by
u is permitted to be passed to v when u acts, just as in the definition of TA-
compliance. If f ∈ L then information is allowed to flow from domain u to
domain v, but it needs to be filtered through the function denoted by f : only
information output by this function may be transmitted from u to v. If u 6v
then no direct flow of information from u to v is permitted.
In some cases, it may be possible for the operating system or network infras-
tructure to enforce a given filter function. However, in general, a filter function
is a local constraint on a trusted component of the system. That is, if u fv for
f 6= >, then component u is trusted to enforce that information sent to v is
filtered appropriately.
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We require that extended architectures have the following properties:
1. For all u, v ∈ D, there exists at most one f ∈ L ∪ {>} such that u fv.
2. The relation  is reflexive in that for all u ∈ D we have (u, u,>) ∈.
The first condition requires that all permitted flows of information from u to v
are represented using a single labeled edge. Intuitively, any policy with multiple
such edges can always be transformed into one satisfying this condition, by
combining the pieces of information flowing across these edges into a tuple that
flows across a single edge. The second condition is motivated from the fact,
already noted above, that information flow from a domain to itself cannot be
prevented.
For example, the following diagram shows an extended architecture with
domains H, D, and L, intended to represent a high-security domain, a trusted
declassifier, and a low-security domain. The arrows indicate permitted flow be-
tween domains. The label on the edge from D to L indicates that information
going from D to L should be filtered by function rel . When drawing extended ar-
chitectures, we annotate arrows between domains with the filter function names.
For arrows drawn without a label, and elided reflexive arrows, the implied label
is >.
DH L
rel
Extended architectures do not define the interpretations of the function
names L. If A = (D,) is an extended architecture, an interpretation for
A is a tuple I = (A, dom, I), where A is a set of actions, dom : A → D assigns
these actions to domains of A, and I is a function mapping each f ∈ L to a
function with domain A∗×A (and arbitrary codomain). We call the pair (A, I)
an interpreted extended architecture, or simply an interpreted architecture.
Intuitively, if u fv and α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A is an action with dom(a) = u,
then I(f)(α, a) is the information that is permitted to flow from u to v when
the action a is performed after occurrence of the sequence of actions α ∈ A∗.
Given extended architecture (D,) and an architectural interpretation I =
(A, dom, I), we define a function ftau with domain A
∗ that, like tau, captures
the maximal information that domain u is permitted to have after a sequence
of actions has been executed. The definition is recursive with a function Tv,u
for u, v ∈ D, mapping a sequence α ∈ A∗ and an action a ∈ A with dom(a) = u
to
Tv,u(α, a) =

 if v 6u
(ftav(α), a) if v
>u
I(f)(α, a) if v fu.
16
Intuitively, Tv,u(α, a) represents the new information permitted to be known by
u when action a is performed after sequence α.
The function ftau is defined by ftau() = , and, for α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A,
ftau(αa) = ftau(α)ˆTdom(a),u(α, a) where ˆ is the operation of appending an
element to the end of a sequence. Some important technical points concerning
the append operation are that for any sequence σ, we define σˆ = σ (i.e., ap-
pending the empty sequence  has no effect), and if δ happens to be a nonempty
sequence, then σˆδ is the sequence that extends the sequence σ by the single
additional element δ. For example if δ is the sequence ab, then σˆδ has final
element equal to the sequence ab rather than b.
Unfolding the definition, we obtain
ftau(αa) =

ftau(α) if dom(a) 6u
ftau(α)ˆ(ftadom(a)(α), a) if dom(a)
>u
ftau(α)ˆI(f)(α, a) if dom(a)
fu.
The first two clauses resemble the definition of tau; the third adds to this that
the information flowing along an edge labeled by a function name f is filtered
by the interpretation I(f). Note that if I(f)(α, a) = , where dom(a) fu, then
ftau(αa) = ftau(α). That is, filter function I(f) can specify that no informa-
tion should flow under certain conditions. Note also that ftau and Tv,u have
implicit parameters, viz., an information flow policy  and an architectural in-
terpretation I = (A, dom, I). When we need to make some of these parameters
explicit, we write expressions such as fta
(,I)
u , or ftau .
The function ftau is used analogously to tau to define the maximal infor-
mation that a domain is permitted to observe for a given sequence of actions.
However, ftau is a more precise bound than tau, as it uses filter functions to
bound the information sent between domains.
It is reasonable to assume that information sent from u to v is information
that u is permitted to have. We say that a function is ftau-compatible when
the information it conveys is determined by information that u is permitted to
have.
Definition 2 Function h with domain A∗ × A is ftau-compatible when for
all sequences α, β ∈ A∗, ftau(α) = ftau(β) implies that for all a ∈ A with
dom(a) = u we have h(α, a) = h(β, a).
We say that the interpretation I = (A, dom, I) is compatible with A = (D,) if
for all u ∈ D and edges u fv with f ∈ L, the function I(f) is ftau-compatible.
In what follows, we require that interpretations be compatible with their archi-
tectures.
A machine complies with an interpreted extended architecture if it has ap-
propriate domains and actions, and for each domain u, what u observes in state
s0·α is determined by ftau(α). We call such a machine FTA-compliant. (“FTA”
is derived from filtered transmission of information about actions.)
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Definition 3 (FTA-compliant) A machine M = 〈S, s0, A, D, step, obs, dom〉
is FTA-compliant with an interpreted architecture (A, I), with A = (D′,) and
I = (A′, dom′, I), if A = A′, D = D′, dom = dom′ and for all agents u ∈ D and
all α, α′ ∈ A∗, if ftau(α) = ftau(α′) then obsu(α) = obsu(α′).
For an interpreted architecture AI, with actions A and domains D, if pi is
an interpretation with pi(p) ⊆ A∗, we write AI, pi, α |= φ if M,pi, α |= φ for all
systems M that are FTA-compliant with AI. Similarly, we write AI, pi |= φ if
AI, pi, α |= φ for all α ∈ A∗.
Separating extended architectures from their interpretations ensures that ex-
tended architectures can be completely represented by graphical diagrams with
labeled edges. It also allows us to deal with examples where an extended ar-
chitecture can be implemented in a variety of ways, and weak constraints on
the set of actions and the set of filter functions suffice to enforce the security
properties of interest. We will present a number of examples of this in what
follows. To capture the constraints on the architectural interpretations at the
semantic level, we use the notion of an architectural specification, which is a pair
(A, C) where A is an extended architecture and C is a set of architectural inter-
pretations for A. (We will not attempt in this paper to develop any syntactic
notation for architectural specifications.)
Definition 4 A machine M is FTA-compliant with an architectural specifica-
tion (A, C) if there exists an interpretation I ∈ C such that M is FTA-compliant
with the interpreted architecture (A, I).
The following theorem shows that FTA-compliance generalizes TA-compliance.
Thus, we are free to interpret a given architecture as an extended architecture.
Theorem 4 Let A1 = (D,1) be an architecture, and let A2 = (D,2) be
the extended architecture such that (u, v, f) ∈2 if and only if f = > and
(u, v) ∈1. Let M be a machine with domains D, actions A and domain
function dom. Let I = (A, dom, I) be any interpretation for A2 with this set of
actions and domain function. Then M is TA-compliant with A1 if and only if
M is FTA-compliant with (A2, I).
Proof: We show that for all u ∈ D, tau is isomorphic to ftau, in the sense
that tau(α) = tau(β) iff ftau(α) = ftau(β). Let g be the function mapping
nested triples to sequences, defined inductively by g() =  and g((t1, t2, a)) =
g(t1)ˆ(g(t2), a). Conversely, let h be the function from the range of g to nested
tuples, defined inductively by h() =  and h(σˆ(x, a)) = (h(σ), h(x), a)). A
straightforward induction shows that h ◦ g is the identity function, so g is 1-1.
We show by induction on α that for all u ∈ D, g(tau(α)) = ftau(α).
The base case is trivial. Assume that for all u ∈ D we have g(tau(α)) =
ftau(α) and consider αa. Let u ∈ D. If dom(a) 61 u then dom(a) 62 u and
g(tau(αa)) = g(tau(α)) by defn tau
= ftau(α) by IH
= ftau(αa) by defn ftau
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If dom(a) 1 u then (dom(a), u,>) ∈2, and
g(tau(αa)) = g((tau(α), tadom(a)(α), a)) by defn tau
= g(tau(α))ˆ(g(tadom(a)(α)), a) by defn g
= ftau(α)ˆ(ftadom(a)(α), a) by IH
= ftau(αa) by defn ftau
It now follows that tau(α) = tau(β) iff ftau(α) = ftau(β). For, if tau(α) =
tau(β) then ftau(α) = g(tau(α)) = g(tau(β)) = ftau(β). Conversely, if
ftau(α) = ftau(β) then g(tau(α)) = g(tau(β)) and we get tau(α) = tau(β)
by injectivity of g. 
FTA-compliance requires that if ftau(α) = ftau(α
′) then the observations
of u in state s0 · α and in state s0 · α′ are equal. The following lemma (similar
to Lemma 1) shows that in fact FTA-compliance implies that if ftau(α) =
ftau(α
′) then we have that viewu(α) = viewu(α′).
We require a technical assumption for this result: say that an interpreted
architecture (A, I) is non-conflating if for all u, v ∈ D, if u fv with f 6= >
then for all actions a, b ∈ A with dom(a) = u and dom(b) = v, and for all
α, β ∈ A∗ we have I(f)(α, a) 6= (ftav(β), b). Recall that by reflexivity, u fv
with f 6= > implies u 6= v. Intuitively, the condition states that, in the context
of the definition of ftav, it is always possible for domain v to distinguish the
type of information I(f)(α, a) transmitted to it from the type of information
(ftav(β), b) transmitted by v to itself. That is, v can distinguish between the
effects of its own actions on ftav and the effects of other domains’ actions. Since,
intuitively, v should be aware of its own actions, it is reasonable to expect that
this is generally satisfied.
Lemma 4 If M is FTA-compliant with non-conflating interpreted architecture
(A, I), with A = (D,) and I = (A, dom, I), then for all agents u ∈ D and all
α, α′ ∈ A∗ such that ftau(α) = ftau(α′) we have viewu(α) = viewu(α′)
Proof: By induction on |α| + |α′|. The base case is trivial. Suppose that the
result holds for all sequences of shorter combined length, and consider strings
αa and α′ such that ftau(αa) = ftau(α′). Note that by FTA-compliance this
implies that obsu(αa) = obsu(α
′). We consider several cases.
• If dom(a) 6u then ftau(α) = ftau(αa) = ftau(α′), so viewu(α) =
viewu(α
′), by the induction hypothesis, and obsu(αa) = obsu(α), by
FTA-compliance. By reflexivity of , we have dom(a) 6= u, so it follows
that
viewu(αa) = viewu(α) ◦ obsu(αa)
= viewu(α)
= viewu(α
′)
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• If dom(a) fu and f 6= > and I(f)(α, a) =  then
ftau(α) = ftau(α)ˆI(f)(α, a) = ftau(αa) = ftau(α
′).
Thus we have viewu(α) = viewu(α
′), by the induction hypothesis, and
obsu(αa) = obsu(α), by FTA-compliance. By reflexivity of , we have
dom(a) 6= u. Therefore
viewu(αa) = viewu(α) ◦ obsu(αa)
= viewu(α)
= viewu(α
′)
• If dom(a) fu and f 6= > and I(f)(α, a) 6=  then ftau(α′) = ftau(αa) =
ftau(α)ˆI(f)(α, a) yields that α
′ 6= . Assume α′ = βb.
– If either dom(b) 6u, or dom(b) gu and g 6= > and I(g)(β, b) = , then
we can swap the roles of αa and βb and apply the argument from the
previous two cases.
– If dom(b) gu and g 6= > and I(g)(β, b) 6=  then
ftau(αa) = ftau(α)ˆI(f)(α, a) = ftau(β)ˆI(g)(β, b) = ftau(βb),
and so ftau(α) = ftau(β), since neither of the appended elements is
. By the inductive hypothesis, viewu(α) = viewu(β). Since f 6= >
and g 6= >, by the reflexivity of , we have dom(a) 6= u and dom(b) 6=
u. Thus
viewu(αa) = viewu(α) ◦ obsu(αa)
= viewu(β) ◦ obsu(βb)
= viewu(βb).
– If dom(b) >u then
ftau(α)ˆI(f)(α, a) = ftau(αa) = ftau(βb) = ftau(β)ˆ(ftau(β), b).
Since I(f)(α, a) 6= , it follows that ftau(α) = ftau(β) and I(f)(α, a) =
(ftau(β), b). However, by the assumption that the interpretation is
non-conflating, the latter implies that dom(b) 6= u. Also, dom(a) 6= u
by reflexivity. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain from ftau(α) =
ftau(β) that viewu(α) = viewu(β). Thus
viewu(αa) = viewu(α) ◦ obsu(αa)
= viewu(β) ◦ obsu(βb)
= viewu(βb).
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• If dom(a) >u then ftau(α′) = ftau(αa) = ftau(α)ˆ(ftadom(a)(α), a).
This means that α′ 6= . Assume α′ = βb.
– If either dom(b) 6u, or dom(b) gu and g 6= > then we can swap the
roles of αa and βb and apply the argument from the first three cases
above.
– If dom(b) >u then ftau(αa) = ftau(α)ˆ(ftadom(a)(α), a) and ftau(βb) =
ftau(β)ˆ(ftadom(b)(β), b). Therefore, we have a = b, and ftau(α) =
ftau(β). By the inductive hypothesis, we have viewu(α) = viewu(β).
If dom(a) = u, then
viewu(αa) = viewu(α) a obsu(αa)
= viewu(β) b obsu(βb)
= viewu(βb).
Alternately, if dom(a) 6= u, then
viewu(αa) = viewu(α) ◦ obsu(αa)
= viewu(β) ◦ obsu(βb)
= viewu(βb).

We note that this result does not hold for conflating interpreted architec-
tures. For example, consider an interpreted architecture in which dom(a) fdom(b)
and I(f)(α, a) = (, b) and a system in which obsu(s) = ⊥ for all u ∈ D
and states s. This system is necessarily FTA-compliant with the architecture,
but we have ftadom(b)(a) = (, b) = ftadom(b)(b) but viewdom(b)(a) = ⊥ and
viewdom(b)(b) = ⊥b⊥.
However, it is always possible to convert an interpretation I into another
equivalent non-conflating interpretation I′, by defining I′(f)(α, a) = (I(f)(α, a), x)
for some fixed value x that is not in A. Note that I and I′ are equivalent in
the sense that I(f)(α, a) = I(g)(β, b) if and only if I′(f)(α, a) = I′(g)(β, b), so
the “information content” of the values of I and I′ are the same. We therefore
assume in what follows that interpreted architectures are non-conflating.
4.2 Example: Starlight Interactive Link
The Starlight Interactive Link [Anderson et al., 1996] provides interactive access
from a high-security network to a low-security network. This allows a user
on the high-security network to have windows open on her screen at differing
security levels, while ensuring no high-security information goes to the low-
security network.
Starlight has both hardware and software components. The hardware device
is connected to both the high-security and low-security networks, and has a
keyboard and mouse attached. There is a switch that can toggle between the
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high-security and low-security networks; input from the mouse and keyboard
are sent to the network currently selected by the switch. Starlight allows data
from the low-security network to be transferred to the high-security network,
but not vice versa. The Starlight software components include proxy window
clients and servers to allow the windowing environment to work in the presence
of the Starlight hardware.
The following diagram shows extended architecture SL, an architecture for
the Starlight Interactive Link. The architecture uses a filter function to specify
what information the Starlight Interactive Link may send to the low-security
network.
H S
L
sf
Domain H represents the high-security network (including the user’s com-
puter); domain L represents the low-security network; domain S represents the
Starlight Interactive Link (including input devices), which routes keyboard and
mouse events to either the high-security or low-security network. Note that
there is no edge from domain L to domain S, as no information is sent directly
from the low-security network to the Starlight Interactive Link. Instead, data
from the low-security network (such as updates to the contents of a window)
are sent to the high-security network, and thence to software components of the
Starlight Interactive Link.
The edge labeled sf restricts what information is allowed to flow from the
Starlight Interactive Link to low-security network L. We present an architec-
tural specification CSL based on SL that expresses a constraint on interpre-
tations of sf . An interpretation (A, dom, I) is included in CSL if the following
conditions hold. Let AS = {a ∈ A | dom(a) = S} be the set of actions belonging
to domain S. We assume that there is a distinguished action t ∈ AS that toggles
which network is receiving the input events. Intuitively, L is permitted to know
about the occurrence of any t action, and the occurrence of any other action in
AS (e.g., keyboard or mouse input) that happens while the low-security network
is selected (i.e., after an odd number of toggle actions). We capture this by the
following assumption on interpretation I:
I(sf )(α, a) =

a if a = t or
#t(α) is odd and a ∈ AS
 otherwise
where #t(α) is the number of occurrences of t in α. For example, with the αi
consisting of only H and L actions, and a 6= t an S action, we have
I(sf )(α0, a) = ,
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I(sf )(α0 a, t) = t,
I(sf )(α0 a tα1, a) = a, and
I(sf )(α0 a tα1 a tα2, a) = , etc.
It is straightforward to check for such an interpretation that it is non-
conflating and that I(sf ) is ftaS-compatible.
4.2.1 Information security properties
The component S, corresponding to the Starlight Interactive Link, is a trusted
component, and the sf filter is a local constraint on the component. To verify
that a system satisfies specification (SL, CSL), we would need to verify that S
appropriately filters information sent to L, and that all other communication in
the system complies with the architecture, to wit, that H cannot communicate
directly with L, and L cannot communicate directly with S.
If a system does satisfy specification (SL, CSL), then we can show that do-
main L never knows any H-dependent propositions. Indeed, we can show some-
thing stronger, that L never knows any proposition about H actions and S
actions that occur while the high-network is selected.
To fully capture this intuition requires a little care, since a proposition such
as “H did action a between the first and second t actions” should not be known
to L, but refers both to something that should be hidden from L and to some-
thing that L is permitted to observe (the t actions). We handle this using an
approach that is similar to the way we used G-dependent propositions above.
Let the canonical form of a sequence α ∈ A∗ be the (unique) representation
α = α0tα1tα2 . . . tαn where each αi contains no t actions. Define togL : A
∗ →
A∗ be the function such that if α = α0tα1tα2 . . . tαn is the canonical form,
then
togL(α) = (α0  L) t (α1  LS) t (α2  L) t . . . t (αn  Hn),
where Hn = L if n is even and Hn = LS if n is odd. Intuitively, this is the
subsequence consisting of the events that L is permitted to observe. All other
events in α are H events, and S events that occurred while the system was
toggled to High. We say that a proposition X is toggle-High dependent at α
if there exists a sequence β ∈ A∗ such that togL(α) = togL(β) but α ∈ X iff
β 6∈ X. Intuitively, this says that changing iα by adding or deleting H events
and S events that L is not permitted to know about, we can change the value
of the proposition X.3
Theorem 5 Suppose system M is FTA-compliant with architectural specifica-
tion (SL, CSL). If pi(p) is a toggle-H dependent proposition at α, then M,pi, α 
¬KLp.
3This definition of toggle-High-dependent differs from that used in the earlier version of
this work published at LAW12. The present formulation simplifies and strengthens the cor-
responding result, Theorem 5.
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Proof: We first show that ftaL(α) = ftaL(togL(α)) for all α ∈ A∗. The proof
is by induction on α. The base case of α =  is trivial. Consider the sequence
αa and assume that ftaL(α) = ftaL(togL(α)). Let the canonical form of α be
α = α0tα1tα2 . . . tαn
If dom(a) = L then togL(αa) = togL(α)a and
ftaL(αa) = ftaL(α)ˆ(ftaL(α), a)
= ftaL(togL(α))ˆ(ftaLtogL((α)), a) by induction
= ftaL(togL(α)a)
= ftaL(togL(αa))
as required. If dom(a) = S and #t(α) is odd then togL(αa) = togL(α)a and
ftaL(αa) = ftaL(α)ˆI(sf )(α, a)
= ftaL(togL(α))ˆI(sf )(α, a) by induction
= ftaL(togL(α))ˆI(sf )(togL(α), a) by observation above
= ftaL(togL(α)a)
= ftaL(togL(αa))
as required. If dom(a) = S and #t(α) is even then togL(αa) = togL(α) and
I(sf )(α, a) = , so
ftaL(αa) = ftaL(α)ˆI(sf )(α, a)
= ftaL(α)
= ftaL(togL(α)) by induction
= ftaL(togL(αa))
as required. Finally, if dom(a) = H then togL(αa) = togL(α) , and since H 6L,
we have
ftaL(αa) = ftaL(α)
= ftaL(togL(α)) by induction
= ftaL(togL(αa))
as required. This completes the proof that ftaL(α) = ftaL(togL(α)).
We now prove the theorem. Suppose system M is FTA-compliant with ar-
chitectural specification (SL, CSL) and let pi(p) be a toggle-H dependent propo-
sition at α. Them there exists β ∈ A∗ such that togL(α) = togL(β) and
α ∈ pi(p) iff β 6∈ pi(p). By what was shown above, we have ftaL(α) = ftaL(β).
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Since M is FTA-compliant, it follows that viewL(α) = viewL(β), and we have
M,pi, α  ¬KLp. 
Note that we would not be able show this security property in an architecture
without filter functions, since the domain S can communicate with both H and
L. It is the filter function that allows us to show that S’s communication with L
reveals nothing about H actions, and only limited information about S actions.
4.3 Example: Downgrader
Many systems downgrade information, releasing confidential information to un-
trusted entities. Because it is a sensitive operation, downgrading is typically
restricted to certain trusted components, called downgraders.
The following diagram shows extended architecture DG, containing low-
security domain L, high-security data store H for two domains of high-security
users C and P , and downgrader D.
C
P
H D L
rel
This architecture represents a system where some information is allowed
to flow from the high-security domain H to low-security domain L, but only
through the downgrader D. In particular, we assume that domain L is permit-
ted to know about the actions of P (via downgrader D), but should never know
anything about the actions of C. This may be an appropriate model for a gov-
ernment agency where some sensitive information may be released to the public,
but certain sensitive data (e.g., the identity and activity of covert employees,
represented by domain C) should never be released.
The filter function for rel restricts the information that may be released
from D to L. It is a local constraint on the trusted component D. The filter
function should ensure that nothing is revealed about the actions of C. We
define an architectural specification CDG to restrict our attention to architectural
interpretations with suitable filter functions.
We first define an interpretation of the function rel that states that the
information transmitted across this edge is the maximum information that D
would have if the domain C were completely cut off from the other domains.
Let ′ be the information flow policy such that (u, v, f) ∈′ if and only
if f = > and either u = v = C or there exists an edge (u, v, g) ∈ and
{u, v} ⊆ {P,H,D,L}. This is the policy depicted in the following diagram,
where, as usual, we omit reflexive edges:
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CP
H D L
Let (A, dom, I) ∈ CDG if and only if (A, dom, I) is an interpretation of DG such
that I(rel)(α, a) = (fta
′
D (α), a) for all α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A with dom(a) = D.
Thus, architectural interpretations in CDG ensure that fta′D is an upper-bound
on information that may be released from D to L. It is straightforward to
check that these architectural specifications are non-conflating. The required
compatibility constraint is also satisfied, as shown in the following result.
Proposition 1 If (A, dom, I) ∈ CDG then I(rel) is ftaD -compatible.
Proof: For u ∈ {P,H,D,L}, define the functions Fu inductively, by Fu() = 
and
Fu(σˆ(δ, a))
=

Fu(σ) if dom(a) = C
Fu(σ)ˆ(Fdom(a)(δ), a) if dom(a) 6= C and dom(a) 6= D and u 6= L
Fu(σ)ˆ(δ, a) if dom(a) = D (so dom(a) 6= C) and u = L
We claim that for all α ∈ A∗ and u ∈ {P,H,D,L}, we have Fu(ftau (α)) =
fta
′
u (α). It is then immediate that fta

D (α) = fta

D (β) implies fta
′
D (α) =
fta
′
D (β), and it easily follows that I(rel) is fta

D -compatible.
To prove the claim we proceed by induction on α. the base case of α =  is
trivial. Assuming the claim holds for α, let u ∈ {P,H,D,L} and consider the
sequence αa. There are several cases:
• Case 1: dom(a) >u and dom(a) 6= C. By definition of ′, we have
dom(a)
>
′u. Thus,
Fu(ftau(αa)) = Fu(ftau(α)ˆ(ftadom(a)(α), a))
= Fu(ftau(α))ˆ(Fdom(a)(ftadom(a)(α)), a)
= fta
′
u (α)ˆ(fta
′
dom(a)(α), a) by induction
= fta
′
u (αa).
• Case 2: dom(a) >u and dom(a) = C. In this case, dom(a) 6′ u. Thus,
Fu(ftau(αa)) = Fu(ftau(α)ˆ(ftadom(a)(α), a))
= Fu(ftau(α))
= fta
′
u (α) by induction
= fta
′
u (αa).
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• Case 3: dom(a)relu, so dom(a) = D and u = L. By definition of ′, we
have dom(a)
>
′u. Thus,
Fu(ftau(αa)) = Fu(ftau(α)ˆI(rel)(α, a)
= Fu(ftau(α)ˆ(fta
′
dom(a)(α), a))
= Fu(ftau(α))ˆ(fta
′
dom(a)(α), a) by def. Fu
= fta
′
u (α)ˆ(fta
′
dom(a)(α), a) by induction
= fta
′
u (αa).
• Case 4: dom(a) 6u. In this case also dom(a) 6′ u. Thus,
Fu(ftau(αa)) = Fu(ftau(α))
= fta
′
u (α) by induction
= fta
′
u (αa).
Thus, the claim holds in all cases.

The architectural specification imposes restrictions on what information L
knows and when. Domain L can only learn about other domains via downgrader
D. The restriction on filter functions for rel ensures that L cannot know any-
thing about the actions of C, since C 6′H, and so the function fta′D does not
contain any information about the actions of C. However, information about
the actions of H, P and D may be released to L. Also, L cannot learn about
actions of other domains that occurred after the last D action. The following
two theorems express these restrictions.
Theorem 6 If M is FTA-compliant with architectural specification (DG, CDG)
and pi(p) depends on G actions at α, then M,pi, α  ¬KLp.
Proof:
Let G = C = {P,H,D,L}. We first claim that fta′u (γ  G) = fta
′
u (γ)
for any γ ∈ A∗ and u ∈ G. We proceed by induction on |γ|. The base case is
trivial. Suppose that fta
′
u (γ  G) = fta
′
u (γ) for u ∈ G and consider γa. We
consider several cases.
• If dom(a) f′u then f = > and dom(a) ∈ G, by the definition of ′. Thus
fta
′
u ((γa)  G) = fta
′
u ((γ  G)a)
= fta
′
D (γ  G)ˆ(ftadom(a)(γ  G), a) by defn fta
′
D
= fta
′
D (γ)ˆ(ftadom(a)(γ), a) by IH
= fta
′
D (γa) by defn fta
′
D
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• If dom(a) 6′u and dom(a) ∈ G then
fta
′
u ((γa)  G) = fta
′
u ((γ  G)a)
= fta
′
u (γ  G) by defn fta
′
u
= fta
′
u (γ) by IH
= fta
′
u (γa) by defn fta
′
u
• If dom(a) 6′u and dom(a) 6∈ G then
fta
′
u ((γa)  G) = fta
′
u (γ  G) as dom(a) 6∈ G
= fta
′
u (γ) by IH
= fta
′
u (γa) by defn fta
′
u
This completes the proof of the claim. In particular, we have fta
′
D (γ  G) =
fta
′
D (γ), for all γ. Note that this implies, for all γ and a ∈ A with dom(a) = D,
that I(rel)(γ  G, a) = (fta′D (γ  G), a) = (fta
′
D (γ), a) = I(rel)(γ, a).
We now show that ftaL(γ) = ftaL(γ  G). We proceed by induction on |γ|.
The base case is trivial. Consider γa, and assume that ftaL(γ) = ftaL(γ  G).
We consider several cases.
• If dom(a) ∈ {C,P,H} then dom(a) 6L, so ftaL(γa) = ftaL(γ) by defini-
tion of ftaL. We have that (γa)  G is either γ  G or (γ  G)a, but in
either case, ftaL((γa)  G) = ftaL(γ  G) by the definition of ftaL. By
the inductive hypothesis, we have ftaL(γa) = ftaL((γa)  G) as required.
• If dom(a) = L then γa  G = (γ  G)a, so
ftaL(γa) = ftaL(γ)ˆ(ftaL(γ), a)
= ftaL(γ  G)ˆ(ftaL(γ  G), a) by the IH
= ftaL((γ  G)a)
= ftaL((γa)  G)
• If dom(a) = D then
ftaL(γa) = ftaL(γ)ˆI(rel)(γ, a)
= ftaL(γ)ˆI(rel)(γ  G, a) as I(rel)(γ  G, a) = I(rel)(γ, a)
= ftaL(γ  G)ˆI(rel)(γ  G, a) by the IH
= ftaL((γ  G)a)
= ftaL((γa)  G) since dom(a) = D ∈ G
This completes the proof that ftaL(γ) = ftaL(γ  G) for all γ.
Since pi(p) depends on C actions at α, there exists β ∈ A∗ such that α 
G = β  G but α ∈ pi(p) iff β 6∈ pi(p). By the claim just proved, we have
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ftaL(α) = ftaL(α  G) = ftaL(β  G) = ftaL(β), from which α ≈L β follows
by compliance. It follows that M pi,α |= ¬KL(p). 
Actions of the downgrader are the only means by which L acquires knowledge
about other domains’ actions. Thus, L knows nothing about any action of other
domains that occur after the last D action. To state this formally, we say that
proposition X is about C, P , and H activity after the last D action if there
exists a set Y ⊆ A∗ such that for all α ∈ A∗, α ∈ X ⇐⇒ F (α) ∈ Y , where F
is defined recursively by F () =  and
F (βa) =

 if dom(a) = D
F (β)a if dom(a) ∈ {C,P,H}
F (β) otherwise
Intuitively, F returns the C, P , and H actions that occur after the last D action,
and so proposition X is about C, P , and H activity after the last D action if
membership in X depends only on the C, P , and H actions that occur after the
last D action.
Theorem 7 If M is FTA-compliant with architectural specification (DG, CDG)
and pi(p) is a non-trivial proposition about C, P , and H activity after the last
D action, then M,pi  ¬KLp.
Proof: Let α ∈ A∗. Since pi(p) is non-trivial, there is an α′ such that α ∈
pi(p) ⇐⇒ α′ 6∈ pi(p). Let α1 be the longest suffix of α such that α1 does not
contain any D actions. Then α = α0α1, where either α0 =  or the last action
of α0 is a D action. Let β = α0(α1  {L})F (α′). Note that F (β) = F (α′), and
so α ∈ pi(p) ⇐⇒ β 6∈ pi(p). We will show that ftaL(α) = ftaL(β).
First, note that ftaL(β) = ftaL(α0(α1  {L})F (α′)) = ftaL(α0(α1 
{L})) since F (α′) contains only actions a such that dom(a) 6L. Note also that
ftaL(α) = ftaL(α0α1) = ftaL(α0(α1  {L})) since α1 contains only L actions
and actions a such that dom(a) 6L.
Therefore, ftaL(β) = ftaL(α) as required. Since M is FTA-compliant, by
Lemma 4 we have viewL(α) = viewL(β), and so α ≈L β, which immediately
implies the result. 
4.4 Example: Electronic election
The following diagram shows architecture EE , an electronic election for n
voters, coordinated by an election authority ElecAuth.
ElecAuth
v1 v2 vn...
resultsresultsresults
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There is one domain vi for each voter, and a single domain ElecAuth for the
election authority. The architecture permits arbitrary information to flow from
a voter to the election authority, but uses filter function results to restrict what
information may flow from the election authority to each voter.
In many elections, the behavior of individual voters is confidential informa-
tion: it should not be known how voters voted. (Elections have several security
requirements. For example, the final result should be correctly computed from
the votes—an integrity requirement. We focus here on the confidentiality re-
quirement for voters.)
By specifying an additional local constraint on the election authority, we can
show that this architecture enforces anonymity on the identity of the voters,
thus satisfying the confidentiality requirement about the behavior of voters.
The election authority’s compliance with this local constraint might be assured
by means of a careful verification of its implementation, or carefully designed
cryptographic protocols (which may remove some or all of the trust required to
be placed in the election authority).
We first assume that voters are homogenous in that they have the same set
of actions. Let (EE , I) be an interpreted architecture where I = (A, dom, I).
We say that architecture interpretation I is voter homogenous if for any voter
v, the set of possible actions Av = {a ∈ A | dom(a) = v} equals {av | a ∈ AV },
where AV is the set of action types available to voters. Intuitively, a
v represent
the action of type a when performed by voter v.
We define a voter permutation P as a permutation over the set of voters V .
Since all voters have the same set of actions in a voter-homogenous interpre-
tation, we can apply a permutation P to sequence α ∈ A∗, written P (α), as
follows:
P () = 
P (αa) = P (α)a if dom(a) 6∈ V
P (αav) = P (α)aP (v) if a ∈ AV .
We apply permutation P to proposition X ⊆ A∗ by applying P to each sequence
α ∈ X, i.e.,
P (X) = {P (α) | α ∈ X} .
Using voter permutations, we can now state the local constraint that election
results do not depend on (and thus do not reveal) the identity of any voter.
A1. Election results have the following identity-oblivious property: Given voter-
homogenous interpreted architecture (EE , I) where I = (A, dom, I), for
all voter permutations P , sequences α ∈ A∗, and actions a ∈ A with
dom(a) = ElecAuth, we have I(results)(α, a) = I(results)(P (α), a).
There are several possible interpretations of results that satisfy this con-
straint, such as a function that returns each candidate and her vote tally, or a
function that returns the total number of votes submitted. However, a function
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that returns a ballot and the identity of the voter that submitted it doesn’t
satisfy constraint A1.
We define architecture specification CEE such that I ∈ CEE if and only if I
is a voter-homogenous interpretation of EE that satisfies constraint A1.
Given the local constraint A1, we can show that if voter v believes that some
proposition X may be satisfied, then v also believes that P (X) may be satisfied,
for any voter permutation P with P (v) = v. For example, if Alice considers it
possible that Bob voted for Obama and Charlie voted for Romney, then Alice
considers it possible that Charlie voted for Obama and Bob voted for Romney.
Before stating and proving this result, we first prove a useful lemma: a voter’s
view of an election does not depend on the identity of other voters. That is, for
any permutation P such that P (v) = v, the sequences α and P (α) appear the
same to voter v.
Lemma 5 Let system M be FTA-compliant with (EE , CEE). For all voters v,
voter permutations P such that P (v) = v, and sequences α, α ≈v P (α).
Proof: Since M is FTA-compliant with (EE , CEE), there is an I = (A, dom, I) ∈
CEE such that M is FTA-compliant with interpreted architecture (EE , I).
We show, by induction on the length of α, that ftav(α) = ftav(P (α)).
The base case is trivial. Consider sequence αa, and assume that ftav(α) =
ftav(P (α)). We show that ftav(αa) = ftav(P (αa)).
If dom(a) = v then
ftav(P (αa)) = ftav(P (α)a) as P (a) = a
= ftav(P (α))ˆ(ftav(P (α)), a) by defn ftav
= ftav(α)ˆ(ftav(α), a) by IH
= ftav(αa) by defn ftav
If dom(a) ∈ V \ {v} then dom(a) 6v, so
ftav(P (αa)) = ftav(P (α)b) for some b ∈ A, dom(b) ∈ V \ {v}
= ftav(P (α)) by defn ftav
= ftav(α) by IH
= ftav(αa) by defn ftav
If dom(a) = ElecAuth then
ftav(P (αa)) = ftav(P (α)a) as P (a) = a
= ftav(P (α))ˆI(results)(P (α), a) by defn ftav
= ftav(α)ˆI(results)(P (α), a)) by IH
= ftav(α)ˆI(results)(α, a) by A1
= ftav(αa) by defn ftav
Thus, if all cases, ftav(α) = ftav(P (α)). Therefore, by Lemma 4, α ≈v
P (α). 
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Theorem 8 Let system M be FTA-compliant with architectural specification
(EE , CEE). Let v be a voter. For all voter permutations P such that P (v) = v,
if pi(q) = P (pi(p)), then M,pi, α  ¬Kv¬p⇒ ¬Kv¬q for all α ∈ A∗.
Proof: Suppose M,pi, α  ¬Kv¬p. Then there is some sequence β such that
viewv(α) = viewv(β) and β ∈ pi(p). By Lemma 5, viewv(β) = viewv(P (β)),
so viewv(α) = viewv(P (β)). Since P (β) ∈ P (pi(p)), we have M,pi, P (β)  q, so
M,pi, α  ¬Kv¬q as required. 
Note that Theorem 8 does not imply that voter v learns nothing about
other voters. For example, if the election results reveal that all voters voted
for Obama, then voter v knows how every other voter voted. Also, if there are
only 2 voters, v and w, then the results may reveal to v exactly how w voted.
However, Theorem 8 provides anonymity: given the results, voter v cannot
distinguish the behavior of other voters.
5 Architectural refinement
During the process of system development, architectural designs are often re-
fined by decomposing components into sub-components. We investigate the
preservation of information security properties with respect to architectural re-
finement, including refinement of extended architectures.
Van der Meyden [2012] defines architectural refinement for information-flow
architectures as follows: architecture A1 = (D1,1) is a refinement of archi-
tecture A2 = (D2,2) if there is a function r : D1 → D2 such that r is onto
D2 and for all u, v ∈ D1, if u1 v then r(u) 2 r(v). We write A1 ≤r A2 if
A1 refines A2 via refinement function r.
Intuitively, if A1 refines A2, then A1 provides more detail than A2, as it is a
finer-grain specification of security domains and the information flows between
them. Refinement function r indicates how domains in D2 are decomposed into
subdomains in D1: for all u ∈ D1, u is a subdomain of r(u) ∈ D2. (Also,
we say that r(u) is the superdomain of domain u.) The refinement function
r ensures that information flows between subdomains in A1 are in accordance
with information flows between domains in A2.
Example: The Hinke-Schaefer architecture HS refines architecture HL via
refinement function r that maps Huser , HDBMS , and HF to H, and maps Luser ,
LDBMS , and LF to L. All information flows within HS are permitted by HL,
including the flow from LF to HDBMS , which is permitted as L H. Figure 2
show the architectural refinement graphically. 
It is shown by van der Meyden [2012] that TA-compliance is preserved by
refinement. That is, if machine M = 〈S, s0, A, D1, step, obs, dom〉 is TA-
compliant with architecture A1, and A1 ≤r A2, then r(M) is TA-compliant
with A2. (Recall that r(M) is the system M with the domains abstracted via
the function r, see Section 3.)
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Huser Luser
HDBMS LDBMS
HF LF
H L
r–1(L)r–1(H)
Figure 2: The Hinke-Schaefer architecture HS refines architecture HL. The
dashed lines and rectangles indicate how the refinement function maps domains
in HS to the H and L domains of HL.
5.1 Architectural refinement for interpreted extended ar-
chitectures
We generalize architectural refinement to extended architectures. Since the
meaning of an extended architecture relies upon the interpretation of filter func-
tions provided in an architectural interpretation, the generalization is stated
semantically, at the level of interpreted extended architectures. However, we
later develop some more syntactic sufficient conditions, which may be more
convenient for giving proofs that this semantic refinement relation holds.
Let AI1 = (A1, I1) and AI2 = (A2, I2) be interpreted extended architec-
tures, where Ai = (Di,i), Ii = (A, domi, Ii) for i = 1, 2. (We assume that the
interpretations have the same set of actions A—we do not attempt to deal with
action refinement.)
Definition 5 We say that a mapping r : D1 → D2 is a semantic refinement
mapping from AI1 to AI2, and write AI1 r AI2, if r is onto D2, we have
dom2 = r ◦ dom1, and for all u ∈ D1 and sequences α, β ∈ A∗, if ftaAI2r(u)(α) =
ftaAI2r(u)(β), then fta
AI1
u (α) = fta
AI1
u (β).
This definition directly implies preservation of FTA-compliance:
Theorem 9 If AI1 r AI2, then for all machines M , if M is FTA-compliant
with AI1, then r(M) is FTA-compliant with AI2.
Proof: Suppose AI1 r AI2. Then for all u2 ∈ D2, if we have ftau2(α) =
ftau2(α
′), then ftav1(α) = ftav1(α
′) for all v1 ∈ r−1(u2) ⊆ D1. Since M
is FTA-compliant with AI1, this will imply that obsv1(α) = obsv1(α′) for all
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v1 ∈ r−1(u2), which by definition of obs′ will imply that obs′u2(α) = obs′u2(α′),
thus showing that r(M) is FTA-compliant with respect to AI2. 
5.1.1 Sufficient conditions for semantic refinement
While semantic refinement therefore has the key property that we want from
a notion of architectural refinement, establishing semantic refinement requires
reasoning about the functions ftau, which have a complicated inductive defini-
tion that, for a given domain u, potentially ranges over the entire set of domains.
It would be advantageous if refinements could be proved in a more local way.
We therefore develop a number of sufficient conditions for semantic refinement
that have this property.
It proves to be helpful to restrict attention to interpreted architectures satis-
fying a stronger version of non-conflation than that introduced above. Say that
an interpreted architecture is strongly non-conflating, if for all u, v, w ∈ D such
that u fw with f 6= > and v >w, we have that for all sequences α, β ∈ A∗ and
actions a, b ∈ A with dom(a) = u and dom(b) = v that I(f)(α, a) 6= (ftav(β), b).
Intuitively, this says that w is able to distinguish between information received
from u and v, or alternately, that domain v, which is unconstrained in the infor-
mation it is able to send to w, is moreover able to authenticate its messages to
w. Note that the special case where v = w gives that a strongly non-conflating
architecture is also non-conflating.
As a first step towards a local definition of refinement, we note that it suffices
to focus on the information that is “transmitted” when an action occurs, as
represented by the functions TAIu,v. Let AI1 = (A1, I1) and AI2 = (A2, I2)
be fully filtered interpreted extended architectures, where Ai = (Di,i), and
Ii = (A, domi, Ii) for i = 1, 2. (As above, we require that the interpretations
have the same set of actions A.) Formally, define a refinement mapping from
AI1 to AI2 to be a function r : D1 → D2 such that the following conditions
hold.
T1 The function r is onto D2, and dom2 = r ◦ dom1.
T2 For all u, v ∈ D1, α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A with dom1(a) = u, if TAI2r(u),r(v)(α, a) = ,
then TAI1u,v (α, a) = .
T3 For all u ∈ D2 and v ∈ D1, α, β ∈ A∗ and a, b ∈ A, if
TAI2
dom2(a),r(v)
(α, a) = TAI2
dom2(b),r(v)
(β, b) 6= 
then either (i) a = b and dom2(a)
>r(v) or (ii) TAI1dom1(a),v(α, a) = T
AI1
dom1(b),v
(β, b).
We write AI1 vr AI2 when these conditions are satisfied.
Intuitively, condition T2 says that in situations where no information is per-
mitted to flow, by the abstract architecture AI2, between superdomains of the
concrete domains u, v, no information is permitted to flow between the domains
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u, v. It can be seen to be a generalization of the refinement condition (for archi-
tectures without filter functions) considered by van der Meyden [2012]. Stated
in the contrapositive, T2 says that if TAI1u,v (α, a) 6=  then TAI2r(u),r(v)(α, a) 6= . In
particular, in the case where u >v, we have TAI1u,v (α, a) = (ftau(α), a) 6= , so
TAI2r(u),r(v)(α, a) 6= . This requires that there exists an edge r(u) gr(v).
Condition T3 is somewhat technical, but intuitively states that if it is possi-
ble for a superdomain r(v) to detect the occurrence of both action a performed
after α, and action b performed after β, but is not able to distinguish these
actions, then it should also not be possible for the subdomain v to distinguish
these actions, as stated in case (ii) of the condition. We separate out case (i)
for technical reasons. It covers one situation, easily checked by inspection of the
architecture, where it can be shown that v cannot distinguish the two actions
(we prove this in the context of Theorem 10 below).
We now show that this more localized notion of refinement provides a suf-
ficient condition for semantic refinement. In what follows, to lighten the no-
tation, we drop the superscripts AI1 and AI2 from terms like ftaAI1u (α)
and TAI2
dom2(a),r(u)
(α, a), since it will always remain clear from the domains (here
u ∈ D1 or dom2(a), r(u) ∈ D2) which architecture is intended.
Theorem 10 Suppose that AI1 and AI2 are strongly non-conflating inter-
preted architectures. If AI1 vr AI2 then AI1 r AI2.
Proof: Suppose AI1 vr AI2. We need to show that for all domains u ∈ D1 and
sequences α, β ∈ A∗, if ftar(u)(α) = ftar(u)(β) then ftau(α) = ftau(β). We
show this by induction on the combined length of α and β. The case of α = β = 
is trivial. Consider sequences αa and β, such that ftar(u)(αa) = ftar(u)(β),
where the claim holds for shorter sequences. We consider two cases, depending
on whether Tdom2(a),r(u)(α, a) = .
If Tdom2(a),r(u)(α, a) = , then by condition T2, we have Tdom1(a),u(α, a) = .
In this case, we also have, by definition, that
ftar(u)(α) = ftar(u)(α)ˆTdom2(a),r(u)(α, a) = ftar(u)(αa) = ftar(u)(β).
Thus, by the induction hypothesis, we have ftau(α) = ftau(β). Since Tdom1(a),u(α, a) =
, we obtain that
ftau(αa) = ftau(α)ˆTdom1(a),u(α, a) = ftau(α) = ftau(β),
as required.
Alternately, if Tdom2(a),r(u)(α, a) 6= , then since
ftar(u)(β) = ftar(u)(αa) = ftar(u)(α)ˆTdom2(a),r(u)(α, a),
it follows that β is not . We may therefore write β = β′b, where b ∈ A.
We now have two further cases. If Tdom2(b),r(u)(β
′, b) = , then we may ap-
ply the argument above with the roles of αa and β′b switched. Otherwise,
Tdom2(b),r(u)(β
′, b) 6= . Since ftar(u)(αa) = ftar(u)(β′b) states that
ftar(u)(α)ˆTdom2(a),r(u)(α, a) = ftar(u)(β
′)ˆTdom2(b),r(u)(β
′, b)
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and neither of the appended elements is , it follows that ftar(u)(α) = ftar(u)(β
′)
and Tdom2(a),r(u)(α, a) = Tdom2(b),r(u)(β
′, b). By the induction hypothesis, we ob-
tain that ftau(α) = ftau(β
′). Also, by condition T3 we have either (i) a = b
and dom2(a)
>r(u) or (ii) Tdom1(a),u(α, a) = Tdom1(b),u(β′, b). We claim that (ii)
also holds in case (i). It then follows, by definition, that ftau(αa) = ftau(β
′b),
as required.
To prove the claim, note that in case (i), we have
Tdom2(a),r(u)(α, a) = Tdom2(b),r(u)(β
′, b) = Tdom2(a),r(u)(β
′, a)
and since we have an edge dom2(a)
>r(u) this states that (ftadom2(a)(α), a) =
(ftadom2(a)(β
′), a). In particular, we have ftadom2(a)(α) = ftadom2(a)(β
′). By
induction, it follows that ftadom1(a)(α) = ftadom1(a)(β
′). There are now several
possibilities, depending on the nature of the edge, if any, from dom1(a) = dom1(b)
to u in AI1.
1. if dom1(a) 6u, then by definition, Tdom1(a),u(α, a) =  = Tdom1(b),u(β′, b).
2. If dom1(a)
>u, then Tdom1(a),u(α, a) = (ftadom1(a)(α), a) = (ftadom1(b)(β′), b) =
Tdom1(b),u(β
′, b).
3. If dom1(a)
f1u with f1 6= >, then it follows from ftadom1(a)(α) = ftadom1(a)(β′),
using compatibility of I1(f1), that Tdom1(a),u(α, a) = I1(f1)(α, a) = I1(f1)(β
′, a) =
I1(f1)(β
′, b) = Tdom1(b),u(β
′, b).
Thus, in all cases, we have Tdom1(a),u(α, a) = Tdom1(b),u(β
′, b). 
The refinement relation v is quite general and captures the essence of the
relation between semantic architectural refinement and refinement of the in-
formation that flows over the edges of an architecture. However, to establish
that the conditions hold may still require reasoning about the complex “global”
functions ftau. For example, in the case where an edge r(u)
fr(v) with f 6= >
is refined by an edge u >v, we need to prove a relationship between the “local”
function I2(f), and the recursive function ftau. We therefore develop a more
specific set of conditions that do support a more local approach to proof of a
refinement, in which we need to consider only the edges not labelled by >.
Define a strict refinement mapping from AI1 to AI2 to be a function r :
D1 → D2 such that the following conditions hold.
S1 The function r is onto D2, and dom2 = r ◦ dom1.
S2 For u, v ∈ D1, if u >v then r(u) >r(v).
S3 For all u, v ∈ D1, if u f1v with f1 6= > then there exists an edge r(u) f2r(v)
with either f2 = > or f2 6= > and for all α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A with dom1(a) = u
we have I2(f2)(α, a) =  implies I1(f1)(α, a) = .
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S4 For all u ∈ D1 and actions a, b ∈ A, if dom2(a) f2r(u) and dom2(b) g2r(u)
where f2 6= > and g2 6= >, then either
(a) dom1(a) 6u and dom1(b) 6u, or
(b) there exists an edge dom1(a)
f1u with f1 6= > but dom1(b) 6u, and
for all α, β ∈ A∗ such that I2(f2)(α, a) = I2(g2)(β, b) 6=  we have
I1(f1)(α, a) = , or
(c) dom1(a) 6u but there exists an edge dom1(b) g1u with g1 6= >, and
for all α, β ∈ A∗ such that I2(f2)(α, a) = I2(g2)(β, b) 6=  we have
I1(g1)(β, b) = , or
(d) there exist edges dom1(a)
f1v and dom2(b) g1v with f1 6= > and g1 6= >,
and for all α, β ∈ A∗, such that I2(f2)(α, a) = I2(g2)(β, b) 6=  we have
I1(f1)(α, a) = I1(g1)(β, b).
Note that in the case where all edges in the two architectures are labelled by
>, conditions S1-2 amount to the notion of architectural refinement of van der
Meyden [2012]. For edges labelled with non-> labels, Condition S3 states that
whenever information is not permitted to flow between two superdomains, it is
not permitted to flow between their subdomains.
Condition S4, like condition T3, is intended to capture that if a superdomain
cannot distinguish two actions a and b, then neither can its subdomains. How-
ever, S4 restricts the statement of this property to filtered edges, i.e., edges not
labelled >. The essence of the property is most easily visible in condition S4(d),
which corresponds to a situation where both dom1(a) and dom1(b) have filtered
edges to a subdomain. The remaining cases deal with all the other possible
configurations that are consistent with S2.
Note that cases (b) and (c) of S4 say that where a superdomain r(u) is not
able to distinguish the actions a and b, it is not permitted for the subdomain u to
receive information flow as a result of one action but not the other. Intuitively,
this would imply that the subdomain can deduce which action occurred, giving
it more information than its superdomain, whereas our intuition for refinement
is that it should not increase the amount of information flow.
We remark that S4 does not need to consider the situation where dom2(a)
f2r(u)
with f2 6= > and dom2(b) >r(u) because in strongly non-conflating architectures,
it is impossible that Tdom2(a),r(u)(α, a) = Tdom2(b),r(u)(β, b).
Theorem 11 If AI2 is strongly non-conflating and AI1 strictly refines AI2
by function r, then AI1 vr AI2.
Proof: Assume that AI1 and AI2 are strongly non-conflating and that condi-
tions S1–4 hold. We prove conditions T1-3. T1 is trivially identical to S1.
For condition T2, we consider that contrapositive. Suppose that u, v ∈ D1
and α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A with dom1(a) = u and Tu,v(α, a) 6= . We need to prove
that Tr(u),r(v)(α, a) 6= . From Tu,v(α, a) 6=  we obtain that there exists an edge
u f1v. If f1 = >, then by S2, we have that r(u) >r(v), and since dom2(a) =
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r(dom1(a)) = r(u) by S1, this implies that Tr(u),r(v)(α, a) = (ftar(u)(α), a) 6= .
Alternately, if f1 6= >, then by S3, there exists an edge r(u) f2r(v), with either
f2 = > or f2 6= > and I2(f2)(α, a) =  implies I1(f1)(α, a) = . In the case
f2 = > we argue exactly as above. In case f2 6= >, since we have I1(f1)(α, a) =
Tu,v(αa) 6= , we obtain  6= I2(f2)(α, a) = Tr(u),r(v)(α, a), again as required.
For condition T3, suppose Tdom2(a),r(v)(α, a) = Tdom2(b),r(v)(β, b) 6= . We
have to show that either (i) a = b and dom2(a)
>r(v), or (ii) Tdom1(a),v(α, a) =
Tdom1(b),v(β, b). From Tdom2(a),r(v)(α, a) = Tdom2(b),r(v)(β, b) 6=  it follows that
there exist edges dom2(a)
f2r(v) and dom2(a) g2r(v). We consider several cases,
depending on whether these edges are labelled > or not.
If f2 = g2 = >, then Tdom2(a),r(v)(α, a) = (ftadom2(a)(α), a) and Tdom2(b),r(v)(β, b) =
(ftadom2(b)(β), b), and it follows that a = b and we have (i).
The case that f2 = > and g2 6= > is not possible, by the assumption that
the architecture AI2 is strongly non-conflating.
If f2 6= > and g2 6= >, then by S4, we have one of four possibilities.
(a) dom1(a) 6v and dom1(b) 6v. In this case, Tdom1(a),v(αa) =  = Tdom1(b),v(βb).
(b) There exists an edge dom1(a)
f1v with f1 6= > but dom1(b) 6v, and I2(f2)(α, a) =
I2(g2)(β, b) 6=  implies I1(f1)(α, a) = . In this case, since
I2(f2)(α, a) = Tdom2(a),r(v)(α, a) = Tdom2(b),r(v)(β, b) = I2(g2)(β, b) 6= ,
we obtain that I1(f1)(α, a) = . Thus, Tdom1(a),v(α, a) = I1(α, a) =  =
Tdom1(b),v(β, b).
(c) This case is identical to case (b) with the roles of αa and βb reversed.
(d) There exists edges dom1(a)
f1v and dom1(b) g1v with f1 6= > and g1 6= >
and I2(f2)(α, a) = I2(g2)(β, b) 6=  implies I1(f1)(α, a) = I1(g1)(β, b).
Since I2(f2)(α, a) = Tdom2(a),r(v)(α, a) = Tdom2(b),r(v)(β, b) = I2(g2)(β, b) 6=
 we obtain I1(f1)(α, a) = I1(g1)(β, b), which is identical to Tdom1(a),v(α, a) =
Tdom1(b),v(β, b).
Thus, in each case, we have Tdom1(a),v(α, a) = Tdom1(b),v(β, b), as required. 
We remark that although condition S4 is somewhat complex, under a reason-
able assumption it can be replaced by the following much simpler condition S5,
which states more transparently that at least as much information is permitted
to flow along abstract edges as is permitted to flow along any corresponding
concrete edges.
S5 For α, β ∈ A∗ and a, b ∈ A and v ∈ D1 such that dom1(a) = dom1(b), and
dom1(a)
f11v and dom2(a) f22r(v), where f1 6= > and f2 6= >, if I2(f2)(α, a) =
I2(f2)(β, b) 6= , then I1(f1)(α, a) = I1(f1)(β, b).
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Say that messages are source-identifying with respect to r, if there exists
a function S mapping the union of the ranges of the filter functions I2(f) of
AI2 to the set of domains D1 of AI1, such that for all α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A,
if r(dom1(a))
f22w and I2(f2)(α, a) 6= , then S(I2(f2)(α, a)) = dom1(a). One
example of when this condition can be met is when I2(f2)(α, a) = (g(α), a) for
some function g, since then the function S((x, a)) = dom1(a) obviously has the
required property.
Lemma 6 If messages are source-identifying with respect to r and r satisfies
conditions S1, S2 and S5 then r satisfies condition S4.
Proof: Suppose dom2(a)
f22r(v), dom2(b) g22r(v) with f2 6= > and g2 6= >. Let
u ∈ D1. By condition S2, we cannot have dom1(a) >u or dom1(b) >u. This
leaves four possibilities, depending on whether there is an non->-labelled edge
between dom1(a) or dom1(b) and u or not. In case there are no such edges,
we have condition S4(a). We consider the three other possibilities. For each
case, observe that if there exists α, β ∈ A∗ with I2(f2)(α, a) = I2(g2)(β, b) 6= ,
then dom1(a) = S(I(f2)(α, a)) = S(I(g2)(β, b)) = dom1(b), by the assumption
that messages are source-identifying with respect to r. Conversely, if dom1(a) 6=
dom1(b), then I2(f2)(α, a) = I2(g2)(β, b) 6=  cannot be satisfied.
• Suppose there exists an edge dom1(a) f1u with f1 6= > and dom1(b) 6u. In
this case, we must have dom1(a) 6= dom1(b), so by the observation above,
I2(f2)(α, a) = I2(g2)(β, b) 6=  cannot be satisfied. Thus, condition S4(b)
is vacuously satisfied.
• Suppose dom1(b) 6u but there exists an edge dom1(a) g1u with g1 6= >.
This case is similar to the previous one, yielding S4(c).
• Suppose there exist edges dom1(a) f1u and dom1(a) g1u with f1, g1 6= >. If
I2(f2)(α, a) = I2(g2)(β, b) 6= , then as observed above, we have dom1(a) =
dom1(b), and hence also f1 = g1 by the fact that there is at most one
edge between any two domains. Thus, by S5, we have I(f1)(α, a) =
I(f1)(β, b) = I(g1)(β, b). This establishes condition S4(d).
Thus, in all cases, we have proved condition S4. 
5.1.2 Properties of architectural refinement
Architectural refinement provides a design methodology in which we may prove
certain security properties at a high level of abstraction, and preserve the validity
of those properties as details of the architectural design are specified. Since
an interpreted architecture AI specifies a set of actions A, any interpretation
function pi mapping atomic propositions to subsets of A∗ can be treated as an
interpretation for any system M that is FTA-compliant with AI. For a formula
φ, we write AI, pi |= φ if M,pi |= φ for all systems M that are FTA-compliant
with AI.
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Recall that AI1 r AI2 entails that AI1 and AI2 have the same set of
actions A. Since interpretations pi map each propositional constant to a subset
of A∗, the two interpreted architectures also have the same interpretations. The
following result shows that a property that has been shown to follow from com-
pliance with AI2 can be translated to a property that follows from compliance
with AI1.
Theorem 12 Suppose AI1 and AI2 are interpreted extended architectures such
that AI1 r AI2. Let pi be an interpretation for these architectures. Suppose φ
is a formula for the domains of AI2, and AI2, pi  φ. Then AI1, pi  r−1(φ).
Proof: Suppose that system M is FTA-compliant with AI1. Since AI1 r
AI2, it follows by Theorem 9 that r(M) is FTA-compliant with AI2. Hence
r(M), pi  φ. By Theorem 1 we obtain that M,pi |= r−1(φ). 
The level of abstraction used to model a system may affect the success or ef-
ficiency of a proof of a given global security property. Theorem 12 can facilitate
proofs of security properties that are preserved under refinement: simpler, more
abstract, architectures can be used to reason about the security property, and
preservation under refinement ensures that the security property will hold of
systems satisfying a more refined architecture. We demonstrate this in Sections
5.3 and 5.4 below, using more abstract architectures to prove security results
about the Hinke-Schaefer architecture and a refinement of the downgrader ar-
chitecture.
5.2 Specification Refinement
We can also define refinement at the level of architectural specifications. Sup-
pose that A1 = (D1,1) and A2 = (D2,2) are architectures, and r is a func-
tion mappingD1 ontoD2. If C1 and C2 are architectural specifications forA1 and
A2, respectively, then we write (A1, C1) r (A2, C2) when for all interpretations
I1 ∈ C1 there exists an interpretation I2 ∈ C2 such that (A1, I1) r (A2, I2).
Architectural specifications may allow multiple architectural interpretations,
and these may allow the set of actions A in the systems being specified to vary.
In order to interpret the logic of knowledge, we need an interpretation pi that
maps each propositional constant to a subset of A∗. When A varies, we need pi
to vary correspondingly. To ensure proper coordination between interpretations
pi and sets of actions A, we work with sets M of interpreted systems, i.e., pairs
(M,pi) where M is a system and pi is an interpretation. Such a set M may
express weak conditions such as “pi(p) is a G-dependent proposition”. We write
M, (A, C) |= φ when M,pi |= φ for all (M,pi) ∈ M such that M FTA-complies
with (A, C). We also write r(M) for {(r(M), pi) | (M,pi) ∈M}.
Theorem 13 Let M1,M2 be sets of interpreted systems for architectures A1,
A2, respectively, and let φ be a formula for the domains of A2. Suppose that
(A1, C1) r (A2, C2) and r(M1) ⊆ M2 and M2, (A2, C2) |= φ. Then we have
M1, (A1, C1) |= r−1(φ).
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Proof: Let (M,pi) ∈ M1 and suppose M is FTA-compliant with (A1, C1). We
need to show that M,pi |= r−1(φ). By definition, there exists an interpretation
I1 such that M is FTA-compliant with (A1, I1). Since (A1, C1) r (A2, C2), it
follows that there exists an interpretation I2 such that (A1, I1) r (A2, I2). By
Theorem 9, it follows that r(M) is FTA-compliant with (A2, I2), and hence also
with (A2, C2). Moreover, since r(M1) ⊆ M2, we have (r(M), pi) ∈ M2. Thus
r(M), pi |= φ. By Theorem 1 we obtain that M,pi |= r−1(φ), as required. 
We may similarly define (A1, C1) ≤r (A2, C2) to hold when for all interpre-
tations I1 ∈ C1 there exists an interpretation I2 ∈ C2 such that (A1, I1) ≤r
(A2, I2). Additionally, we may define (A1, C1) to be a strict refinement of
(A2, C2) by function r when for all interpretations I1 ∈ C1 there exists an inter-
pretation I2 ∈ C2 such that (A1, I1) is a strict refinement of (A2, I2).
Theorem 14 If (A1, C1) is a strict refinement of (A2, C2) by function r then
(A1, C1) vr (A2, C2), and if (A1, C1) vr (A2, C2) then (A1, C1) r (A2, C2).
Proof: Straightforward using Theorem 10 and Theorem 11. 
5.3 Example: Hinke-Schaefer
Since the Hinke-Schaefer architecture HS refines architecture HL, we can apply
the information security result for HL, Theorem 2, to HS: since domain L
never knows any H-dependent proposition, the domains Luser , LDBMS , and LF
never know any u-dependent proposition, for u ∈ {Huser , HDBMS , HF }. This
information security property was stated as Theorem 3, in Section 2.2. We give
a simple proof for it here.
Proof of Theorem 3: Follows easily from Theorem 2, Lemma 3, and The-
orem 12, since HS ≤r HL for refinement function r such that r(Luser ) =
r(LDBMS ) = r(LF ) = L and r(Huser ) = r(HDBMS ) = r(HF ) = H. 
Thus, we were able to prove an information security property about HS by
proving an appropriate policy in the much simpler architecture HL.
5.4 Example: Downgrader
In the architecture DG of Section 4.3, there is a filter function on the edge from
downgrader D to Low security domain L, specifying that D should not release to
L any information about C. This makes D a trusted component in the system:
in any implementation, we would need to verify that D correctly enforces this
information flow constraint. However, information about C may become co-
mingled with information about P in the data store H, so it is not immediately
clear how D could, on its own, guarantee enforcement of the constraint. Thus,
it seems that the architecture implies constraints on other components. One
approach that could be pursued to implement this architecture is to ensure that
the data store H maintains secure provenance information, which D can use
to check that information being released is not tainted with information from
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C. In this section, we pursue another approach, which is to move the trust
boundary in such a way that D is prevented from obtaining information about
C. We develop an architecture DGR that has this property, and show it to be
a refinement of DG. It follows that any system compliant with DGR is also
complaint with DG. Since it is much clearer how architecture DGR could be
implemented with just local verification of its trusted components, this moves
us closer to a practical implementation of DG.
The following diagram shows architectureDGR, with grouping of its domains
(indicated by dashed rectangles) indicating a refinement mapping r to the ar-
chitecture DG. In DGR, domain H of DG is decomposed into two domains
HC and HP corresponding respectively to data stores of information about C
and P . Domain P is decomposed into two domains T and U , corresponding
to trusted and untrusted users within this domain. Thus, the mapping r from
the domains of DGR to the domains of DG is given by r(HP ) = r(HC) = H,
f(T ) = r(U) = P and r(u) = u for u ∈ {C,D,L}.
C
T
U
HC
HP D L
P
H
f
In DGR, T is a trusted component, since this domain is required to en-
force an information flow constraint, represented by the edge T fHP . On the
other hand, note that whereas in DG, domain D is trusted, because of the edge
DrelL, in DGR the edge from D to L is labelled >, so D is no longer a trusted
component in DGR.
We define architectural specification CDGR so that (A, dom, I) ∈ CDGR if
and only if (A, dom, I) is an interpretation of DGR such that I(f) is defined by
I(f)(α, a) = a for all α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A with dom(a) = T , and I(f)(α, a) = 
otherwise. Intuitively, this states that f permits information about T actions
to flow from T to HP , but nothing more. It is trivial to check that this inter-
pretation is ftaT -compatible.
Theorem 15 (DGR, CDGR) r (DG, CDG)
Proof: We need to work with three distinct architectures in this proof. To
distinguish them, we use 1 to refer to the information flow policy of DGR,
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2 to refer to the information flow policy of DG, and ′ to refer to the policy
used in the definition of I(rel) (see Section 4.3). Let AI1 = (DGR, I1) where
I1 = (A, dom1, I1) ∈ CDGR. We need to show that there exists I2 ∈ CDGR
with AI1  AI2. In fact, there exists a unique architectural interpretation
I2 = (A, dom2, I2) ∈ CDGR with the same set A of actions and dom2 = r ◦ dom1,
so let I2 be this interpretation. Recall from Section 4.3 that I2 is defined
by reference to the information flow policy ′ once A and dom2 are fixed, by
I2(rel)(α, a) = (ftaD′(α), a) when α ∈ A∗ and dom(a) = D.
We show that refinement mapping r satisfies conditions T1-T3. (Note that
we cannot apply strict refinement, because r(D) = D, r(L) = L and the edges
D >1L and D rel2L violate S2.) T1 is immediate from the definitions above.
For T2, note the only ways that we could have TAI2
dom2(a),r(v)
(α, a) =  for α ∈
A∗ and a ∈ A is when dom2(a) 62 r(v) or dom2(a) = D and r(v) = L and
I(rel)(α, a) = . In case dom2(a) 62 r(v), we also have dom1(a) 61 v, so also
TAI1
dom1(a),v
(α, a) = . On the other hand, the situation dom2(a) = D and r(v) = L
and I(rel)(α, a) =  is impossible, since I2(rel)(α, a) = (ftaD(α), a) 6= . Thus
T2 holds.
For T3, we need to show that for all domains u of DGR and v of DG, α ∈ A∗
and a, b ∈ A, if TAI2
dom2(a),r(v)
(α, a) = TAI2
dom2(b),r(v)
(β, b) 6=  then either (i) a = b
and dom2(a)
>2r(v) or (ii) T
AI1
dom1(a),v
(α, a) = TAI1
dom1(b),v
(β, b).
Suppose first that r(v) ∈ {C,P,H,D}. Note that the only incoming edges for
these domains inDG are labelled>. Hence, if TAI2
dom2(a),r(v)
(α, a) = TAI2
dom2(b),r(v)
(β, b) 6=
 it follows that dom2(a)
>2r(v) and dom2(b) >2r(v) and (ftadom2(a)(α), a) =
(ftadom2(b)(β), b). Thus a = b, and we have (i).
Alternately, suppose that r(v) = L. If dom2(a) = dom2(b) = L then the
previous argument also applies. If dom2(a) = L and dom2(b) = D (or vice
versa), then TAI2
dom2(a),r(v)
(α, a) = TAI2
dom2(b),r(v)
(β, b) states (fta2
dom2(a)
(α), a) =
(fta
′
dom2(b)
(β), b), which is impossible since we cannot have a = b when these
actions are in different domains.
Thus, the only case remaining to be considered is when r(v) = L and
dom2(a) = dom2(b) = D. Here we have T
AI2
dom2(a),r(v)
(α, a) = (fta
′
D (α), a) and
TAI2
dom2(b),r(v)
(β, b) = (fta
′
D (β), b), so equality of these terms implies that a = b
and fta
′
D (α) = fta
′
D (β). It is not the case that D
>2L, so we need to es-
tablish that TAI2
dom2(a),r(v)
(α, a) = TAI2
dom2(b),r(v)
(β, b), which, in light of the edge
D >1L, amounts to (fta
1
D (α), a) = (fta
1
D (β), b). As we already have a = b,
it suffices to show fta1D (α) = fta
1
D (β).
To obtain the required result, we claim that for all α, β ∈ A∗, we have that
fta
′
D (α) = fta
′
D (β) implies fta
1
D (α) = fta
1
D (β). For this, we prove that
there exist functions Fu for u ∈ {T,U,HU , D, L} such that Fu(fta′r(u)(α)) =
fta1u (α). The claim is then immediate from the case u = D. We define the
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Fu inductively by Fu() =  and
Fu(σˆ(δ, a)) =

Fu(σ)ˆ(Fdom1(a)(δ), a) if dom1(a)
>1u
Fu(σ)ˆa if dom1(a) = T and u = HU
Fu(σ) if dom1(a) 61 u .
Note that in case dom1(a)
>1u and u ∈ {U,HU , D, L}, we must have dom1(a) ∈
{U,HU , D, L}, so the recursion in the first case is well defined.
We prove by induction on α ∈ A∗ that Fu(fta′r(u)(α)) = fta1u (α) for
u ∈ {U,HU , D, L}. The base case of α =  is trivial. Consider αa, where the
statement holds for α. There are several possibilities:
Case 1: dom1(a)
>1u. In this case, dom2(a)
>
′r(u). Thus,
Fu(fta
′
r(u)(αa)) = Fu(fta
′
r(u)(α)ˆ(fta
′
dom2(a)
(α), a))
= Fu(fta
′
r(u)(α))ˆ(Fu(fta
′
dom2(a)
(α)), a)
= fta1u (α))ˆ(fta
1
dom1(a)
(α)), a) by induction
= fta1u (αa).
Case 2: dom1(a) = T and u = HU . In this case, dom1(a)
f1r(u) and dom2(a) =
P , r(u) = H, and P
>
′H. Thus,
Fu(fta
′
r(u)(αa)) = Fu(fta
′
r(u)(α)ˆ(fta
′
dom2(a)
(α), a))
= Fu(fta
′
r(u)(α))ˆa
= fta1u (α))ˆa by induction
= fta1u (α))ˆI1(f)(α, a)
= fta1u (αa).
Case 3: dom1(a) 61 u and dom2(a) 6′ r(u). In this case,
Fu(fta
′
r(u)(αa)) = Fu(fta
′
r(u)(α))
= fta1u (α) by induction
= fta1u (αa).
Case 4: dom1(a) 61 u and dom2(a) >′r(u). Then
Fu(fta
′
r(u)(αa)) = Fu(fta
′
r(u)(α)ˆ(fta
′
dom2(a)
(α), a))
= Fu(fta
′
r(u)(α))
= fta1u (α)ˆa by induction
= fta1u (αa).
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
Any machine M that is compliant with architectural specification (DG, CDG)
does not reveal any C-dependent proposition to L. Since CDGR refines CDG , the
same property holds for any machine M that is compliant with (DGR, CDGR).
We thus prove an information security property about architecture DGR by
reference to the more abstract architecture DG.
Theorem 16 If M is FTA-compliant with architectural specification (DGR, CDGR)
and pi(p) depends on C actions at α then M,pi, α  ¬KLp.
Proof: Follows easily from Theorem 6 and Theorem 12, since CDGR ≤r CDG . 
The proof of Theorem 15 uses the conditions T1-T3, and requires a somewhat
laborious induction on the length of α to prove condition T3. The simpler and
more local conditions for strict refinement cannot be used in this case, because
r(D) = D, r(L) = L and the edges D >L in DGR and DrelL in DGR violate
condition S2. To illustrate the application of strict refinement, we consider an
architectural specification that varies CDGR by varying the allowed interpreta-
tions of the filter function f . According to CDGR, every action of domain T is
permitted to have an effect on domain HP . In practice, some of the actions
of domain T will have the purpose of communicating information to domain
C, and it would not be desirable for such actions to be recorded in HP . Let
ComTC be the set of such communications actions. We specify that information
about such actions is not permitted to flow from T to HP . Let C′DGR be the
architectural specification so that (A, dom, I′) ∈ C′DGR if and only if (A, dom, I′)
is an interpretation of DGR such that I′(f) is defined by I′(f)(α, a) = a for all
α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A \ ComTC with dom(a) = T , and I′(f)(α, a) =  otherwise. In
particular, we now have, for the case where dom(a) = T and a ∈ ComTC, that
I′(f)(α, a) = , whereas in the corresponding interpretation in CDGR we would
have I(f)(α, a) = a in this case.
Theorem 17 (DGR, C′DGR) strictly refines (DGR, CDGR) by the identity func-
tion r.4
Proof: Let I1 = (A, dom1, I1) ∈ C′DGR. We may define an architectural inter-
pretation for DGR by I2 = (A, dom2, I2) where dom2 = dom1, and the interpre-
tation I2 for DGR is defined by I2(f)(α, a) = a for all α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A with
dom2(a) = T , and I2(f)(α, a) =  otherwise.
Let AI1 = (DGR, I1) and AI2 = (DGR, I2). The domains of these two
interpreted architectures are the same, so the identity function r on the set
of domains D1 = D2 = {C, T, U,HC , HP , D, L} has the right type to be a
refinement mapping. We show that AI1 strictly refines AI2 by r, from which
we may conclude that (DGR, C′DGR) strictly refines (DGR, CDGR) by r. For the
proof, we use conditions S1-S3 and S5, and invoke Lemma 6 to obtain S4.
4We remark that this result implicitly also requires the technical side condition that  6∈ A
for any set of actions A in an interpretation.
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Conditions S1 and S2 are trivial from the fact that the architectures in AI1
and AI2 are the same and r is the identity function. For condition S3, suppose
that u, v ∈ D1 with u f1v with f1 6= >. Then f1 = f , u = T and v = HP .
We need to show that there exists an edge r(u) f2r(v) with either f2 = > or
f2 6= > and for all α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A with dom1(a) = u we have I2(f2)(α, a) = 
implies I1(f1)(α, a) = . Plainly, the edge T
fHP provides the required edge
witness, with f2 = f 6= >, so it remains to check that for all α ∈ A∗ and
a ∈ A with dom1(a) = T we have I2(f)(α, a) =  implies I1(f)(α, a) = .
This holds trivially, because dom1(a) = T implies dom2(a) = T , in which case
I2(f)(α, a) = a 6= .
For condition S5, let a, b ∈ A and v ∈ D1 such that dom1(a) = dom1(b),
and dom1(a)
f11v and dom2(a) f22r(v), where f1 6= > and f2 6= >. Then we
must have dom1(a) = dom2(b) = T , v = HP and f1 = f2 = f . We need to
show that for α, β ∈ A∗, if I2(f)(α, a) = I2(f)(β, b) 6= , then I1(f)(α, a) =
I1(f)(β, b). But I2(f)(α, a) = I2(f)(β, b) 6=  implies that a = b ∈ A \ ComTC,
so I1(f)(α, a) = a = b = I1(f)(β, b), as required.
To obtain condition S4 using Lemma 6, we need also that messages are
source-identifying with respect to r. For this, define S(x) = dom1(x). Let
α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A, and suppose r(dom1(a)) f22w and I2(f2)(α, a) 6= . Then we
have f2 = f , dom1(a) = T and w = HP . Thus, I2(f2)(α, a) = I2(f)(α, a) = a,
and S(I2(f2)(α, a)) = dom1(a), as required to establish that messages are source-
identifying. 
6 Implementing Architectures using Access Con-
trol
One of the mechanisms that might be used to enforce compliance with an in-
formation flow architecture is access control restrictions on the ability of do-
mains to read and write objects. This idea was already implicit in the Bell
and La Padula [1976] approach of enforcing that high level information should
not flow to low level domains through a “no read up” and “no write down”
access control policy. The idea was given a more semantically well-founded ex-
pression by Rushby [1992], who established a formal relation between access
control systems and a theory of information flow based on intransitive nonin-
terference policies. Rushby’s “reference monitor conditions” give semantics to
the notion of reading and writing, which was absent in the work of Bell and La
Padula. Rushby’s formulation was sharpened and shown to be closely related
to TA-security by van der Meyden [2007].
In this section, we present a generalization of van der Meyden’s formulation
of access control, and show how enforcement of an access control policy together
with local verification of trusted components can be used to assure that a system
is compliant with an extended architecture.
We first recall some definitions and results from van der Meyden [2007]. The
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system model we have used to this point does not require the states of a system
to be equipped with any internal structure. In practice, systems typically will
be constructed as an assembly of components. To capture this, Rushby [1992]
introduced the notion of a system with structured state, which is a system M
(with states S and domains D) together with
1. a set Obj of objects,
2. a set V of values, and functions
3. contents : S × Obj→ V , with contents(s, n) interpreted as the value of
object n in state s, and
4. observe, alter : D → P(Obj), with observe(u) and alter(u) interpreted
as the set of objects that domain u can observe (or read) and alter (or
write), respectively.
For brevity, we write s(x) for contents(s, x). We call the pair (observe, alter)
the access control table of the machine. For each domain u, we define an equiv-
alence relation of “observable content equivalence” on states s, t ∈ S by s ≈ocu t
if s(x) = t(x) for all x ∈ observe(u).
Rushby introduced reference monitor conditions on such machines in order
to capture formally the intuitions associated with the pair (observe, alter)
being an access control table that restricts the ability of the actions to “read”
and “write” the objects Obj. Van der Meyden [2007] sharpened these conditions
to the following (the difference is in RM2):
RM1. If s ≈ocu t then obsu(s) = obsu(t) .
RM2. For all actions a ∈ A, states s, t ∈ S and objects x ∈ alter(dom(a)), if
s ≈ocdom(a) t and s(x) = t(x) then (s · a)(x) = (t · a)(x).
RM3. If x 6∈ alter(dom(a)) then s(x) = (s · a)(x)
Intuitively, RM1 states that a domain’s observation depends only on the values
of the objects that it can observe (or read). RM2 states that if action a is
performed in a domain u that is permitted to alter an object x, then the new
value of the object after the action depends only on its old value and the values
of objects that domain u is permitted to observe. The final conditions RM3
says that if action a is performed in a domain that is not permitted to alter (or
write) an object x, then the value of x does not change.
We note that the terminology “reference monitor conditions” points to the
fact that these conditions can be enforced by a reference monitor that mediates
all attempts to perform an action, simply by denying requests by a domain u
to read an object not in observe(u) or write to an object not in alter(u).
In addition to the reference monitor assumptions, Rushby considers a con-
dition stating that if there is an object that may be altered by domain u and
observed by domain v, then the information flow policy should permit flow of
information from u to v. (Obviously, the object x provides a channel for infor-
mation to flow from u to v.)
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AOI. If alter(u) ∩ observe(v) 6= ∅ then u v.
Van der Meyden [2007] shows the following, strengthening a result of Rushby
[1992].
Theorem 18 If M is a system with structured state satisfying RM1-RM3 and
AOI with respect to  then M is TA-secure with respect to .
We now develop a generalization of this result to extended architectures.
As a first step, note that in extended architectures, the situation where the
information flow policy potentially permits flow of information from domain u
to domain v corresponds to the existence of an edge u fv for some label f
(possibly >). This motivates the following variant of condition AOI:
AOI′. If alter(u) ∩ observe(v) 6= ∅ then u fv for some f .
Next, we develop a set of conditions that check that information flow con-
straints of the form u fv with f 6= > have been correctly implemented in a
system. Let I = (A, dom, I) be an interpretation of architecture A = (D,).
Consider the following constraints in a system M with actions A, domains D
and domain function dom:
I1. If dom(a) fu for f 6= > and I(f)(α, a) =  and x ∈ observe(u) ∩
alter(dom(a)) then (s0 · αa)(x) = (s0 · α)(x).
I2. If dom(a) fu with f 6= > and dom(b) gu with f 6= > and I(f)(α, a) =
I(g)(β, b) 6=  and x ∈ observe(u)∩ (alter(dom(a))∪ alter(dom(b))) and
(s0 · α)(x) = (s0 · β)(x) then (s0 · αa)(x) = (s0 · βb)(x).
Condition I1 ensures that if filter function f restricts how the domain of
action a may interact with domain u (i.e., dom(a) fu with f 6= >), and the filter
function interpretation does not allow any information flow (I(f)(α, a) = ),
then the action does not change the state of any object x that domain u may
observe and domain dom(a) is allowed to alter. Condition I2 states that if an
action a in domain dom(a) may alter an object x that is observable by domain u
and dom(a) fu then the new state of object x is determined by the interpretation
of filter function f .
We note that verification of these constraints requires consideration only
of domains that are trusted, in the sense that they have outgoing edges not
labelled >, and the objects that such domains are permitted to alter. Thus
verification of these constraints can be localized to the trusted domains. The
following result states that such local verification, together with enforcement
of an access control policy consistent with the information flow policy via a
mechanism satisfying the reference monitor constraints, suffices to assure that
an information flow policy has been satisfied:
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Theorem 19 Let AI be a strongly non-conflating interpreted architecture. Sup-
pose that M is a system with structured state satisfying RM1-RM3, AOI′ and
I1-I2. Then M is FTA-compliant with AI.
Proof: We show that ftau(α) = ftau(β) implies that s0 · α ≈ocu s0 · β, for all
domains u and α, β ∈ A∗. Note that it then follows using RM1 that ftau(α) =
ftau(β) implies obsu(α) = obsu(β), which shows that M is FTA-compliant
with AI.
The proof proceeds by induction on the combined length of α and β. The
base case of α = β =  is trivial. Suppose that ftau(αa) = ftau(β), where the
statement holds for sequences of shorter combined length. We consider several
cases:
Case 1: dom(a) 6u. In this case ftau(α) = ftau(αa) = ftau(β), so by
induction we have s0 ·α ≈ocu s0 · β. We need to show that s0 ·αa ≈ocu s0 · β, i.e.,
that (s0 ·αa)(x) = (s0 ·β)(x) for all x ∈ observe(u). Let x ∈ observe(u). Since
dom(a) 6u, it follows using AOI′ that x 6∈ alter(dom(a)). Thus, by RM3, we
obtain that (s0 ·αa)(x) = ((s0 ·α) · a)(x) = (s0 ·α)(x) = (s0 ·β)(x), as required.
Case 2: dom(a) >u. In this case ftau(β) = ftau(αa) = ftau(α)ˆ(ftadom(a)(α), a),
so β 6= . Let β = γb. If dom(b) 6u, then we can swap the roles of αa and γb and
apply Case 1. If dom(b) fu with f 6= >, then ftau(γb) = ftau(γ)ˆI(f)(γ, b),
and we obtain that I(f)(γ, b) = (ftadom(a)(α), a). Since the architecture is
strongly non-conflating, this case is not possible. We are left with the case that
dom(b) >u. Here ftau(γb) = ftau(γ)ˆ(ftadom(b)(γ), b), and we conclude that
ftau(γ) = ftau(γ) and ftadom(a)(α) = ftadom(b)(γ) and a = b. By the induction
hypothesis, we obtain that s0 · α ≈ocu s0 · γ and s0 · α ≈ocdom(a) s0 · γ. The former
states that for all objects x ∈ observe(u), we have (s0 · α)(x) = (s0 · γ)(x).
Thus, by RM2 and the fact that a = b, it follows that (s0 · αa)(x) = ((s0 · α) ·
a)(x) = ((s0 · γ) · b)(x) = (s0 · γb)(x) for all x ∈ observe(u). This shows that
(s0 · αa) ≈ocu (s0 · γb), as required.
Case 3: dom(a) fu. In this case we have
ftau(β) = ftau(αa) = ftau(α)ˆI(f)(α, a).
There are several possibilities:
• Case 3a: I(f)(α, a) = . In this case we obtain ftau(α) = ftau(β), so s0 ·
α ≈ocu s0 ·β by induction. By RM3, we have (s0 ·αa)(x) = ((s0 ·α) ·a)(x) =
(s0 · α)(x) for x ∈ observe(u) such that x 6∈ alter(dom(a)). Further, by
I1, we have (s0 ·αa)(x) = (s0 ·α)(x) for x ∈ observe(u)∩ alter(dom(a)).
Thus, s0 ·αa ≈ocu s0 ·α, and we conclude that s0 ·αa ≈ocu s0 ·β, as required.
• Case 3b: I(f)(α, a) 6= . Here we must have β 6= , so let β = γb. Arguing
as above, we cannot have dom(b) >u since that contradicts the assumption
that the architecture is strongly non-conflating. The case that dom(b) 6u
can be handled using Case 1 above. We are left with the possibility that
dom(b) gu for some g 6= >. Here ftau(γb) = ftau(γ)ˆI(g)(γ, b). The
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situation where I(g)(γ, b) =  can be handled using the argument of Case
3a. Thus, we may assume that I(g)(γ, b) 6= . We then obtain that
ftau(α) = ftau(γ) and I(f)(α, a) = I(g)(γ, b) 6= . By the induction
hypothesis, we have s0 · α ≈ocu s0 · γ, so (s0 · α)(x) = (s0 · γ)(x) for all
x ∈ observe(u). We need to show that (s0 · αa)(x) = (s0 · γb)(x) for
all x ∈ observe(u). If x ∈ observe(u) ∩ (alter(dom(a) ∪ alter(dom(b)),
then this follows using I2. On the other hand, if x 6∈ alter(dom(a)) and
x 6∈ alter(dom(b)), then by RM3 we get (s0 · αa)(x) = ((s0 · α) · a)(x) =
(s0 · α)(x) = (s0 · γ)(x) = ((s0 · γ) · b)(x) = (s0 · γb)(x), so the desired
conclusion holds in either case.

Conditions I1, I2 are still somewhat non-local because of the reference to α.
Since architectural specifications are stated in terms of these state sequences,
references to them cannot be completely eliminated. However, it is often conve-
nient to factor this reference via properties of the state of the system. Suppose
that for the edge labels f there exist functions F (f) with domain S ×A, satis-
fying the following constraints:
E1. I(f)(α, a) = I(g)(β, b) implies F (f)(s0 · α, a) = F (g)(s0 · β, b)
E2. I(f)(α, a) =  implies F (f)(s0 · α, a) = .
Intuitively, F gives a state-based encoding of an approximation to I.
The following conditions use F to give a variant of the conditions I1, I2 that
is stated with respect to the states of the machine:
I1′. If dom(a) fu for f 6= > and F (f)(s, a) =  and x ∈ observe(u) ∩
alter(dom(a)) then (s · a)(x) = (s)(x).
I2′. If dom(a) fu with f 6= > dom(b) gu with g 6= > and F (f)(s, a) =
F (g)(t, b) 6=  and x ∈ observe(u) ∩ (alter(dom(a)) ∪ alter(dom(b)))
and s(x) = t(x) then (s · a)(x) = (t · b)(x).
The following result states that this state-factored representation implies the
conditions I1-I2.
Theorem 20 Conditions E1-E1 and I1′-I2′ imply I1 and I2.
Proof: Assume E1-E1 and I1′-I2′. For I1, suppose that dom(a) fu for f 6= > and
I(f)(α, a) =  and let x ∈ observe(u) ∩ alter(dom(a)). We need to show that
(s0 ·αa)(x) = (s0 ·α)(x). From I(f)(α, a) = , we get by E2 that F (s0 ·α, a) = .
By I1′ with s = s0 ·α, we the conclude that (s0 ·αa)(x) = (s0 ·α)(x), as required.
For I2, suppose that dom(a) fu with f 6= > and dom(b) gu with f 6=
> and I(f)(α, a) = I(g)(β, b) 6=  and x ∈ observe(u) ∩ (alter(dom(a)) ∪
alter(dom(b))) and (s0 ·α)(x) = (s0 ·β)(x). We need to show that (s0 ·αa)(x) =
(s0 ·βb)(x). By E1, we have F (α, a) = F (β, b). If both values are equal to , then
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we use I1′ to conclude that (s0 ·αa)(x) = (s0 ·α)(x) and (s0 ·βb)(x) = (s0 ·β)(x).
It then follows that (s0 · αa)(x) = (s0 · βb)(x), as required. Alternately, if
F (α, a) = F (β, b) 6= , then by I2′, with s = s0 · α and t = s0 · β, we conclude
that (s0 · αa)(x) = (s · a)(x) = (t · b)(x) = (s0 · βb)(x), as required. 
To illustrate the application of these results, we consider the examples of
architectural specifications introduced above, and show how some particular
systems may be proved to be implementations of these specifications.
6.1 Starlight Architecture
We present an implementation of the Starlight architectural specification (SL, CSL)
as a system with structured state. We first select an architectural interpretation
I = (A, dom, I) in CSL. The actions A of the interpretation are given with their
associated domain as follows:
• The actions of domain S consist of the toggle action t, plus actions k from
a set K, which intuitively represents the set of keyboard actions.
• The actions of domain H consist of the action get, plus actions h drawn
from some set EH representing possible High level events.
• The actions of domain L consist of the action put, plus actions l drawn
from some set EL representing the possible Low level events.
As required by CSL, we assume that I satisfies
I(sf )(α, a) =

a if a = t or
#t(α) is odd and a ∈ AS
 otherwise
where #t(α) is the number of occurrences of t in α.
Next, we construct a system M for the interpreted architecture (SL, I). The
system M is based on the set of objects Obj = {logH , logL, togpos}. Intuitively,
logH and logL are logs of actions observable to H and L, respectively, and togpos
indicates the position of the toggle switch. The objects logH and logL have
values in A∗, and togpos has a value in {H,L}. A state s is just an assignment
of value of the given type to each of the objects, and we have contents(s, x) =
s(x). The initial state s0 is defined by s(logH ) = s(logL) =  and s(togpos) = H.
Transitions are defined by the following code associated to each of the actions:
• for domain S:
t: if togpos = H then togpos := L else togpos := H
k: if togpos = H then logH := logH ˆk else logL := logLˆk
That is, the toggle action t changes the position of the toggle, and k is
recorded in either the High level log or the Low level log, depending on
the position of the toggle.
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• for domain H:
h: logH := logH ˆh
get: logH := logH ˆ logL
Thus, the events h are recorded in the High level log, and get fetches a
copy of the low level log.
• for domain L:
l: logL := logLˆl
put: logH := logH ˆ logL
Similarly the events l are recorded in the Low level log, and put pushes a
copy of the low level log into the High level log.
The access control functions alter and observe are defined by the following
access control table. Here, for an object x and a domain u, we have an entry a
H L S
logH a,o a a
logL o a,o a
togpos a,o
(or o) in the corresponding cell of the table just when x ∈ alter(u) (respectively,
x ∈ observe(u)). We define observations in the system by allowing each domain
to observe the values of all of its observable objects. That is, for each domain
u and state s, we define obsu(s) = s  observe(u).
Proposition 2 The system M is FTA-compliant with architectural specifica-
tion (SL, CSL).
Proof: We show that M satisfies RM1-RM3, AOI′ and I1-I2 with respect to
(SL, I), and invoke Theorem 19 to conclude FTA-compliance. RM1 is immedi-
ate from the fact that we have defined obsu(s) = s  observe(u).
For RM2, we consider each of the actions a and x ∈ alter(dom(a)) in turn,
and show that if s ≈ocdom(a) t and s(x) = t(x) then (s ·a)(x) = (t ·a)(x). Note that
we need to consider only those x ∈ alter(dom(a)) whose value could be changed
by action a, since otherwise (s ·a)(x) = (t ·a)(x) is immediate from s(x) = t(x).
(Since the only way an action could change an object, given the type of code we
have used to define the transition relation is by use of the assignment operator,
for each action we can take the set of objects that it could change to be the set
of objects to which the code for the action makes an assignment.)
• Actions a with dom(a) = S. Suppose s ≈ocS t. Since observe(S) =
{togpos}, this means s(togpos) = t(togpos). Because alter(S) = Obj,
we need to consider all objects x ∈ Obj that could be changed by a,
assuming that s(x) = t(x).
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The only object in alter(S) that could be changed by action t is togpos.
If s(togpos) = t(togpos) = H, we have (s · t)(togpos) = L = (t · t)(togpos),
as required, and similarly if s(togpos) = t(togpos) = L.
For action k, the only objects x that could be changed by k are logH
and logL. We consider the case of logL. Assume s(logL) = t(logL). If
s(togpos) = t(togpos) = H then (s · k)(logL) = s(logL) = t(logL) = (t ·
k)(logL), as required. If s(togpos) = t(togpos) = L, then (s · k)(logL) =
s(logL)ˆk = t(logL)ˆk = (t · k)(logL). The argument for logH is similar.
• Actions a with dom(a) = H. Assume s ≈ocH t. By the access control table,
this means that s(logH ) = t(logH ) and s(logL) = t(logL). For actions h
and get, note that the only object these actions could change is logH . We
have (s · h)(logH ) = s(logH )ˆk = t(logH )ˆk = (t · h)(logH ). Similarly,
(s · h)(logH ) = s(logH )ˆs(logL) = t(logH )ˆt(logL) = (t · h)(logH ).
• Actions a with dom(a) = L. Assume s ≈ocL t. By the access control table,
this means that s(logL) = t(logL).
Action l could change only logL. We have (s · l)(logL) = s(logL)ˆl =
t(logL)ˆl = (t · l)(logL).
Action put could change only logH . Assume that s(logH ) = t(logH ).
Then (s·put)(logH ) = s(logH )ˆs(logL) = t(logH )ˆt(logL) = (t·put)(logH ).
This completes the proof that RM2 is satisfied.
For RM3, we need to show that if x 6∈ alter(dom(a)), then (s · a)(x) = s(x).
This can be done by inspection of the code for each action. In the case of
dom(a) = S, we have Obj \ alter(dom(a)) = ∅, so the claim is trivial. For
dom(a) = H, we have Obj \ alter(dom(a)) = {logL, togpos}, but the only object
assigned to by H actions is logH , so the values of objects in this set are not
changed by H actions. For dom(a) = L, we have Obj\alter(dom(a)) = {togpos},
and L actions do not assign to togpos, so again there is no change to the value
of this object.
To show AOI′, we consider the possible values for x ∈ alter(u)∩observe(v),
and check that there exists an edge u fv in each case.
• For x = logH , the only case of x ∈ observe(v) is v = H. Since there is an
edge from every domain v to H (in the case of v = H there is the implicit
reflexive edge labelled >), AOI′ is immediate in this case.
• For x = logL, we have that x ∈ alter(u) just when u ∈ {L, S}, and
x ∈ observe(v) just when v ∈ {L,H}. For each of these possible values
of u, v there exists an edge from u to v.
• for x = togpos, we have x ∈ alter(u) ∩ observe(v) just when u = v = S,
in which case we have the reflexive edge.
Before considering I1-I2, we establish the following invariant on the states
of M :
For all α ∈ A∗, the number #t(α) is even iff (s0 · α)(togpos) = H. (1)
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It is worth remarking that the proof of this invariant itself benefits from the
property RM3 that we have just established. Note that togpos ∈ alter(u) iff
u = S. Thus, using RM3, we have that (s0 ·α)(togpos) = s0 · (α  {S})(togpos).
Moreover, inspection of the code shows that the actions k of domain S do not
change the value of togpos. Thus, in fact (s0 ·α)(togpos) = s0 ·(α  {t})(togpos),
where we interpret α  B where B is a set of actions to mean the subsequence
of α of actions in B. A straightforward induction on sequences β ∈ {t}∗ shows
that (s0 · β)(togpos) = H if #t(β) is even and (s0 · β)(togpos) = L otherwise.
Since #t(α) = #t(α  {t}), we have #t(α) even iff #t(α  {t}) is even iff
(s0 · α  {t})(togpos) = H iff (s0 · α)(togpos) = H, as required.
We now prove I1. The only case where dom(a) fu for f 6= > is dom(a) = S
and u = L and f = sf . Suppose that I(sf )(α, a) =  and x ∈ observe(L) ∩
alter(S). We need to show that (s0 · αa)(x) = (s0 · α)(x). Now observe(L) ∩
alter(S) = {logL}, so we have x = logL. Further, if dom(a) = S then
I(sf )(α, a) =  just when a 6= t and #t(α) is even. It therefore suffices to
consider the case of a = k. By the invariant (1), since #t(α) is even, we have
(s0 · α)(togpos) = H, so the code for a = k takes the else branch, which does
not change x = logL. Hence (s0 · αa)(x) = (s0 · α)(x), as required.
For I2, the only case where dom(a) fu with f 6= > and dom(b) gu with g 6= >
is dom(a) = dom(b) = S and u = L and f = g = sf . Suppose that I(f)(α, a) =
I(g)(β, b) 6=  and x ∈ observe(u) ∩ (alter(dom(a)) ∪ alter(dom(b))) and (s0 ·
α)(x) = (s0 · β)(x). We need to show that (s0 · αa)(x) = (s0 · βb)(x). In the
relevant case, observe(u) ∩ (alter(dom(a)) ∪ alter(dom(b))) = observe(L) ∩
alter(S) = {logL}, so we have x = logL. Now, if I(f)(α, a) = I(g)(β, b) 6= 
then a = b = t or both #t(α) and #t(β) are odd and a = b ∈ AS \ {t}. In the
former case, the code for a = b = t does not change the value of x = logL, so it
is immediate from (s0 ·α)(x) = (s0 ·β)(x) that (s0 ·αa)(x) = (s0 ·βb)(x). In the
latter case, we have by the invariant (1) that (s0 ·α)(togpos) = (s0 ·β)(togpos) =
L, so the code for a = k takes the else branch from both states and we have
(s0 ·αa)(logL) = (s0 ·α)(logL)ˆa = (s0 ·β)(logL)ˆa = (s0 ·βa)(logL), as required.

Intuitively, the proof of RM2 can be summarized to be a consequence of
the fact that for each action a, the code for action a “reads” only objects in
observe(dom(a)), and “writes” to objects in alter(dom(a)) in ways that depend
only on the values read and the values of the object written to. Note that the
action put assigns a value to the H object logH that depends on the value of the
same object logH , which L is not permitted to observe/read. However, this is
not a violation of RM2. We expect that it is possible to develop a static analysis
that would be sound for checking RM1-3, but we do not pursue this here.
6.2 Downgrader Architecture
Next, we give an example that illustrates the role that code structure can play
in the enforcement of an architecture. We sketch a class of implementations of
the refined downgrader architectural specification (DGR, CDGR) of Section 5.4,
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in the form of systems with structured state. Let I = (A, dom, I) be an architec-
tural interpretation in CDGR. The set of actions Au for each domain u is some
arbitrary set, and I(f) is defined by I(f)(α, a) = a for all α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A
with dom(a) = T , and I(f)(α, a) =  otherwise.
We describe the system M abstractly: for each domain u we assume that
some set of objects Obju is given. For the domain HP , we take ObjHP ={buff , logP}. Intuitively, logP is a log of events that are observable to the
domain HP , and buff is a buffer storing declassification requests from L. The
other domains C, T, U,HC , D and L are associated with an arbitrary set of
objects. The set of all objects Obj is the union of these sets Obju.
The access control table on these objects is given in the following “capability”
formatted table.
C T U HC HP D L
observe ObjC ObjT ObjU ObjHC logP buff , ObjD ObjL
alter ObjC ObjT ObjU ObjHC ObjT ,ObjU ObjD,ObjL ObjL
ObjHC ObjHC logP ObjT ObjD, logP buff , logP buff
logP ObjC
For example, this table says that an object x ∈ ObjU can be observed by domain
U only, and can be altered by domains U and HP .
States are defined to be assignments of a value in some set for each x ∈ Obj.
In case of buff , the value s(buff ) is assumed to be in the set A∗L of L action
sequences. In case of logP , the value is assumed to be in the set (AT ∪ AU ∪
AHP )
∗, i.e., this log records actions in the domains T,U and HP . We assume
each domain observes all its observable objects, i.e., obsu(s) = s  observe(u).
In order to focus on the semantic conditions associated to the edge T fHP ,
we assume that the actions for all domains T are given semantics in such a way
as to satisfy the reference monitor conditions RM2-RM3. For actions a ∈ AT ,
we assume that the code for these actions (which determines the state transition
when the action is performed) has the following structure:
logP := logP ˆa;Pa
where Pa is a program that reads only objects in ObjT and writes only objects
in ObjT ∪ ObjHC .
We now argue that a system within this class of systems satisfies conditions
RM1-RM3, AOI′ and I1-I2. Condition RM1 is trivial from the definition of
observations. Conditions RM2-RM3 have been assumed for all actions except
a ∈ AT . We argue that the latter also satisfy RM2. Given the allowed code
pattern for such actions a, the only objects x that are altered by a are in
{logP} ∪ ObjT ∪ ObjHC . The object logP is altered by appending a. This gives
a result that depends only on the previous value of logP (and the action a being
performed), which satisfies RM2. Other objects x ∈ ObjT ∪ ObjHC are altered
by the code in ways that depend only on the action a and the value of objects
in ObjT = observe(T ), which again satisfies RM2.
55
For RM3 in the case of actions a ∈ AT , note that the complement of
alter(T ) is ObjC ∪ ObjU ∪ ObjD ∪ ObjL ∪ {buff }. Since none of these objects
are written by the code pattern for a, RM3 is satisfied in this case.
Satisfaction of AOI′ can be checked by inspection, considering all possibilities
for x ∈ alter(u) ∩ observe(v) in turn and verifying that there is an edge from
u to v in the policy in each case. For example, we have logP ∈ alter(T ) ∩
observe(HC), but we also have the edge T
fHC .
To check conditions I1-I2, we need only consider the edge T fHC , i.e., we
consider actions a with dom(a) = T and let u = HC . Condition I1 has precon-
dition I(f)(α, a) = . Since always I(f)(α, a) = a 6= , the precondition for I1
is always false and this condition is trivially true.
For condition I2, suppose that dom(a) = dom(b) = T and I(f)(α, a) =
I(f)(β, b) 6=  and x ∈ observe(HP )∩alter(T ) and (s0 ·α)(x) = (s0 ·β)(x). By
definition of I(f) we have a = b. Since observe(HP ) ∩ alter(T ) = {logP}, we
have x = logP and (s0·α)(logP) = (s0·β)(logP). Since the code Pa = Pb does not
alter logP , we obtain that (s0 ·αa)(logP) = (s0 ·α)(logP)ˆa = (s0 ·β)(logP)ˆb =
(s0 · βb)(logP), as required.
This completes the argument that a system constructed as described FTA-
complies with the refined downgrader architectural specification (DGR, CDGR).
We note that by Theorem 15 and Theorem 9, it follows that such a system also
FTA-complies with the architectural specification (DG, CDG).
6.3 Electronic Election
We describe a system that implements the architectural specification (EE , CEE)
for an electronic election of Section 4.4.
We first select a particular architectural interpretation I = (A, dom, I) that
satisfies this specification. We suppose that the election is a referendum with the
voters voting either “yes” or “no”, and the decision determined by a majority
of the voters. We take the set of domains to be V ∪ {ElecAuth}, where V =
{V1, . . . , Vn} represents the set of voters, and ElecAuth is the election authority.
The set of actions A = {yesv | v ∈ V } ∪ {nov | v ∈ V } ∪ {tally}, with
associated domains given by dom(yesv) = dom(nov) = v for all v ∈ V and
dom(tally) = ElecAuth. Note that these actions are voter-homogeneous, as
required by CEE .
The architecture has just one edge label results. Thus, for the interpretation
I, we need to define I(results). Given a sequence α, define the latest action of
voter v to be the action a ∈ {yesv, nov} such that α = α0aα1 and α1 contains
no action b with dom(b) = v, if such a decomposition exists, or ⊥ otherwise. We
now define I(results)(α, tally) for α ∈ A∗ to be the number of voters v whose
latest action is yesv. (Since the election authority has only the one action
tally, this is all that is required to specify I.) That is, in this interpretation,
the information that the election authority is permitted to reveal is the number
of voters who have voted yes in the latest round of voting. (We assume that a
round consists of the events between two consecutive tally actions, but that if
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a voter does not vote in round, their vote defaults to their vote in a previous
round, if any.) It is easily seen that this interpretation is identity-oblivious.
Thus I ∈ CEE .
Next, we describe a system M with structured state and argue that it FTA-
complies with interpreted architecture (EE , I). We take the set of objects of M
to be the set Obj = {v1, . . . , vn, bb}, where vi represents the election authority’s
record of the vote of voter i and b represents a bulletin board where the results
of the election are broadcast to the voters. The objects vi and bb take a value
in {⊥, Y,N}, with ⊥ indicating that no vote has yet been made by the voter,
or in the case of bb, that the election authority has not yet announced a result.
In the initial state, all objects take value ⊥.
Access control on these objects is captured by the following “capability”
formatted table:
Vi ElecAuth
observe bb v1, . . . , vn, bb
alter vi bb
It is straightforward to verify that this table satisfies condition AOI′ for policy
EE . We let each domain’s observation consist of the values of its observable
objects, i.e., obsu(s) = s  observe(u), so that RM1 is satisfied trivially.
The effect of the actions on the state is given by the following code:
yesVi : vi := Y
noVi : vi := N
tally : if |{i | vi = Y }| ≥ n/2 then bb := Y else bb := N
These definitions satisfy conditions RM2 and RM3. For RM2, note that the
actions yesVi and noVi change vi in a way that depends only on the action.
The action tally changes b in a way that depends on v1 . . . , vn, but all of these
objects are observable to ElecAuth. For RM3, we have that the complement of
alter(Vi) is Obj \ {vi}, but Vi’s actions change only vi, and the complement of
alter(ElecAuth) is Obj \ {bb}, and none of the vi are changed by ElecAuth’s
action tally.
To show that this system FTA-complies with the interpreted architecture
(EE , I), we use conditions E1-E2 and I1′-I2′. Let the functions F be given by
F (results)(s, tally) = (|{i | s(vi) = Y }| ≥ n/2), i.e. , the output of F is a
boolean value that indicates whether the majority of the vi have value Y .
We first show that these satisfy E1 and E2. Condition E2 is trivial, since
it is never the case that F (results)(s, a) = . For E1, we first claim that for
all sequences α ∈ A∗, we have that (s0 · α)(vi) = Y iff the latest action of Vi
in α is yes. The proof of this benefits from RM3: since vi ∈ alter(dom(a)) iff
dom(a) = Vi, we have by a straightforward induction that (s0 ·α)(vi) = (s0 ·α 
{Vi})(vi). The latest action of domain Vi in α is the final action (if any) in
α  {Vi}, and (s0 · α  {Vi})(vi) = Y just in case this action exists and equals
yes. The claim now follows.
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We now verify the conditions I1′ and I2′. Condition I1′ is trivial since we
never have F (results)(s, tally) = . For condition I2′, suppose that dom(a) fu
with f 6= > and dom(b) gu with g 6= >. Then we must have f = g = results
and dom(a) = ElecAuth, hence a = tally and u = Vi for some i. Suppose addi-
tionally that F (f)(s, a) = F (g)(t, b) 6=  and x ∈ observe(u)∩(alter(dom(a))∪
alter(dom(b))) and s(x) = t(x). Then x ∈ observe(Vi) ∩ alter(ElecAuth), so
x = bb. By definition of F , we have F (results)(s, tally) = (|{i | s(vi) =
Y }| ≥ n/2) = (|{i | t(vi) = Y }| ≥ n/2) = F (results)(t, tally). In case
this boolean value is true, we have (s · a)(x) = Y = (t · a)(x), otherwise
(s · a)(x) = N = (t · a)(x). In either case, (s · a)(x) = (t · a)(x), as required.
We remark that in this argument, we have used a function F (results) that
is not an equivalent state-based encoding of the interpretation I(results), but
which is weaker than this interpretation. Correspondingly, in the implemen-
tation, the election authority reveals less information to the voters than the
architectural interpretation permits. The architectural interpretation permits
the election authority to reveal the number of voters who have voted “yes”, but
in the implementation the election authority only reveals whether this number
is at least n/2. The notion of FTA-compliance with an architecture allows this
kind of weakening of information flows in the implementation.
7 Enforcing Architectures on Concrete Platforms
The access control model presented in Section 6 gives an abstract view of how
an extended architecture might be enforced. It identifies a set of conditions
whose satisfaction suffices to ensure that a concrete system is compliant with the
architecture. The process for verification of these conditions in specific settings
is likely to be dependent on the particulars of the implementation platform(s)
being used. We briefly discuss a few of the possible platforms and the techniques
that might be used to show that the access control conditions hold.
Boettcher et al. [2008] survey techniques to achieve separation of compo-
nents, that is, to ensure that communication between components is in accor-
dance with the architecture. In the case of unextended architectures, a very
common technique to ensure compliance with the architecture is to map infor-
mation flow edges to physical causality and use physical separation where there
is no edge. Thus, the architecture HL is commonly enforced in military settings
by mapping H and L to distinct processors and/or networks and using trusted
devices (data diodes) to ensure a one-way information flow from L to H. The
Starlight Interactive Link [Anderson et al., 1996] is a trusted device that can
be added to such an implementation to extend it to an implementation of the
architecture SL.
One of the longstanding objectives of research on military-grade security has
been to avoid the redundancy and consequent expense of such physical imple-
mentations, through the use of implementations that enable different security
levels to share resources such as memory, processors and networks. An imple-
mentation technique that forms the basis for much work in MILS security is the
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use of separation kernels, which are highly simplified operating systems with
the sole functionality of enforcing an information flow policy.
The key mechanism used to achieve this is typically enforcement of an access
control policy by careful management of hardware access control settings and
processor modes to ensure that when a process runs, it may read and write
only memory regions authorized by the access control policy. Attempts to read
or write memory regions that violate the policy are denied by the hardware
access control measures. This ensures that the reference monitor conditions
RM2 and RM3 are satisfied. RM1 could be guaranteed by ensuring that the
hardware access control setting ensures that all peripheral devices with which
a user may interact are mapped to memory regions that are associated to the
domain of that user. Use of separations kernels introduces the risk that there
are covert channels, but much progress has been made in recent years towards
formal proofs that separation kernels enforce an information flow policy (e.g.,
Greve et al. [2003]; Heitmeyer et al. [2006]; Murray et al. [2013]).
An alternative to the use of hardware access control to ensure satisfaction of
the reference monitor conditions is to verify, e.g., using static analysis methods,
that the code in each domain (e.g., the code describing how the actions of the
domain affect the state) reads and writes only locations that are permitted by
the policy. Once this has been done, this code can safely run free of hardware
access control. This approach is taken in the Singularity system [Hunt and
Larus, 2007].
The specifics of the static analysis techniques to be used to enforce the refer-
ence monitor conditions will be very language dependent, but can benefit from
programming language techniques including type safety and encapsulation con-
structs including objects, object ownership, and aspects [Kiczales, 1996]. Some
of the abstract reasoning in the examples above is already suggestive of such
techniques. For example, in the election example, the Election Authority can
be viewed as owning the objects vi and voter Vi can be viewed as having a capa-
bility to call a method on object vi. The code pattern used in the downgrader
example for actions a ∈ AT could be enforced using aspect-oriented techniques.
Once a basic (unextended) architecture has been shown to be enforced by
the implementation, it remains to demonstrate that the trusted components in
the architecture satisfy their local constraints (e.g., constraints I1 and I2). As
these local constraints are application specific, and implementation dependent,
it seems unlikely that a single methodology will suffice. We expect that theo-
rem proving, model checking, and language-based information flow techniques
[Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003] may all be used to provide assurance of satisfac-
tion of the local constraints and the filtering requirements introduced by our
extended architectures.
We note that our framework is highly expressive, and it may not always
be possible to show compliance with a filtering requirement using only local
information. For example, directly implementing the filtering requirements of
the downgrader architectural specification (DG, CDG) by means of controls at
the downgrader component D would seem to require the cooperation of High
level components (e.g., provision of secure provenance information) to ensure
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that the downgrader does not release information concerning C. (The refined
architectural specification (DGR, CDGR) avoids the need for this cooperation by
shifting the trust boundary.) Identifying sufficient conditions for local verifica-
tion of compliance is an interesting topic for future research.
8 Related Work
The most closely related work is that of van der Meyden [2007, 2012], who de-
fines TA-security and considers refinement of architectures on the basis of this
semantics. Our contribution is to show that the definition of TA-security sup-
ports derivation of global information security properties, to extend TA-security
to architectures that include filter functions, and to develop an account of ar-
chitectural refinement for these extended architectures. The extension provides
a way to specify the behavior of trusted components in a system: intuitively,
if a component is the source of an edge in the architecture labeled by a filter
function, then the component is trusted to ensure that the interpretation of the
filter function limits the information that may flow along the edge. We have pre-
sented a number of examples that show that interesting information-theoretic
global security properties can be derived from the very abstract statement that
a system complies with such an extended architecture and a set of additional
local properties. We note that these global properties are more general and
application specific than the very particular property “Low does not know any
High secrets” that is most often considered in the literature.
Other work has sought to formally describe system architecture (e.g., AADL
and Acme [Garlan et al., 2000]), and reason about the properties of systems con-
forming to a given architecture. There are many software engineering concerns
that can be reasoned about in architectural design, such as maintainability, and
reliability. This work focuses on reasoning about the information security of
systems, and, as such, our architectures specify local constraints on information
that may be communicated between components. The local constraints allow
the inference of global information security properties. This work is comple-
mentary to work on other aspects of system design.
Relatively little theoretical work takes an architectural perspective on infor-
mation security. One interesting line of work [Hansson et al., 2008] that takes
a similar perspective to ours is conducted in the context the architectural mod-
eling framework AADL. This work is based on the Bell La Padula model [Bell
and La Padula, 1976]. In a similar spirit are works on Model Driven Security,
which extend UML with security modeling notations. Basin et al. [2006] focus
on a UML extension for role-based access control policies and model transforma-
tions to implementation infrastructures such as Enterprise Java Beans or .NET.
Ju¨rjens [2005] extends UML with a focus on reasoning about secrecy in dis-
tributed applications employing security protocols. None of these approaches
use the application-specific abstract non-interference-style semantics that un-
derpins our contribution, nor do they target the type of reasoning envisaged
in the MILS community for development of high-assurance systems built on
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infrastructure such as separation kernels.
Standard notions of refinement reduce the possible behaviors of a system.
However, arbitrary behavioral refinements of a system will, in general, not pre-
serve information security properties [Jacob, 1989]. Previous work has investi-
gated restricting behavioral refinements to preserve information security prop-
erties [Graham-Cunning and Sanders, 1991; O’Halloran, 1992; Roscoe, 1995;
Bossi et al., 2003; Morgan, 2006]. Architectural refinement as used in this pa-
per allows only refinements that reduce the information communicated between
system components. As shown in Section 5, this notion of refinement preserves
certain information security properties. Information security can also be pre-
served under refinement by modifying the refined system [Jacob, 1989; Mantel,
2001]. Other work distinguishes nondeterminism of a system specification from
nondeterminism inherent in the system, and allows refinement only of specifi-
cation nondeterminism [Seehusen and Stolen, 2006; Ju¨rjens, 2005; Bibighaus,
2006]. These works typically consider only the simple policy L  H, rather
than the more general intransitive policies considered here.
Most work on architectural refinement is not directly concerned with infor-
mation security. Zhou and Alves-Foss [2006] propose architecture refinement
patterns for Multi-Level Secure systems development, but do not provide for-
mal semantics. A series of papers [Moriconi and Qian, 1994; Moriconi et al.,
1995, 1997] express architectural designs as logical theories and refinement as a
mapping from an abstract theory to a concrete theory. This approach is used to
establish security properties in variants of the X/Open Distributed Transaction
Processing architecture, using the Bell La Padula model [Bell and La Padula,
1976], which lacks the kind of information flow semantics that we have studied
here. It is not clear if this approach is sufficiently expressive to represent archi-
tectural refinement as used in this paper, and reason about the preservation of
information security under such refinement.
Preservation of information flow properties under system composition has,
like refinement, been considered problematic. In general, the composition of
two secure systems is not guaranteed to be secure. The reason is essentially the
same as for refinement: composition reduces the set of possible behaviors of a
system, enabling an observer to make additional deductions.
A number of approaches have been developed that allow security of a com-
posed system to be derived from security of its components. These include use
of a stronger definitions of security such as restrictiveness [McCullough, 1990]
or bisimulation-based nondeducibility on compositions [Focardi and Gorrieri,
1994]. McLean [1996] proposes a framework for specifying and reasoning about
system composition, and the preservation of possiblistic security properties. In
this work, we are not concerned with showing that security properties that hold
of components also hold of a composite system. Instead we are concerned with
proving global security properties, and identifying local constraints that compo-
nents must satisfy. The literature on preservation of information flow security
under composition has also largely limited itself to the simple policy L H.
To some extent, process algebraic operations can be viewed as expressing
architectural structure. For example, one could take the view that a process
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constructed as the parallel composition of two processes P and Q, with actions
A of the composition then hidden, corresponds to an architecture in which P
and Q are permitted to interact, but which the environment is not permitted to
influence through the set of actions A. However, the semantics of these opera-
tors usually do not preserve this view: typically this composition is understood
in terms of its possible behaviors with respect to the actions that have not been
hidden, and the fact that the system has been composed out of two compo-
nents permitted to interact in a particular way is lost in the meaning of the
composition.
Downgrading has historically been one of the motivations for generalizing
the notion of noninterference to intransitive policies. Roscoe and Goldsmith
[1999] argued against the ipurge-based semantics for noninterference on the
grounds that the meaning it gives to the downgrader policy H  D  L is
too permissive. According to this semantics, any action by the downgrader
D “opens the floodgates,” in the sense that it allows all information about
the High security domain H to flow to the low security domain L. Roscoe
and Goldsmith proposed to deal with this issue by making the semantics of
intransitive noninterference significantly more restrictive, in effect reverting to
the purge-based definition of Goguen and Meseguer [1982, 1984]. Our approach
to downgrading, using a filter function, provides an alternative approach that
enables explicit specification of the information permitted to be released by the
downgrader.
More recent work on downgrading has concentrated on downgrading in the
setting of language-based security. Sabelfeld and Sands [2005] briefly survey
recent work on downgrading in language-based settings, and propose several
dimensions of downgrading, and prudent principles for downgrading. They re-
gard intransitive noninterference as specifying where (in the security levels)
downgrading may occur. Since we interpret security levels as system compo-
nents, our architectures specify where in the system downgrading may occur.
The filter functions that we propose in this work specify what information can
be downgraded and when this may occur. Thus, our work combines the what,
where, and when dimensions of downgrading. Recent work also considers mul-
tiple dimensions of downgrading, including Barthe et al. [2008], Banerjee et al.
[2008], Mantel and Reinhard [2007] and Askarov and Sabelfeld [2007b].
Recent work [Askarov and Sabelfeld, 2007a; Banerjee et al., 2008] consid-
ers “knowledge-based” approaches to downgrading in language-based settings.
However, they do not reason about security properties as general and application
specific as used in this paper. O’Neill [2006] uses epistemic logic to specify many
information security properties, but does not directly consider downgrading.
9 Conclusion
Through the examination of a number of examples, we have shown that strong
information security properties can be proven about a system from a high-level
architectural description of the system. Any system that complies with the
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architecture will satisfy the information security properties that can be proven
about the architecture.
We extended the notion of system architecture to allow finer-grain specifi-
cation of what information may be sent between components. This enables the
proof of stronger security properties, while continuing to providing the benefits
of using a high-level architectural description. We generalized the notion of
architectural refinement [van der Meyden, 2012] for the extended architectures.
Certain security properties are preserved by architectural refinement.
The MILS vision is to build high-assurance systems with well-understood
security properties by composition of COTS infrastructure and trusted com-
ponents. This work brings us closer to that goal by demonstrating that it is
possible to compositionally derive strong, application-specific, information-flow
security properties from high-level system specifications.
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